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Abstract
Air Force organizations have been directed to implement the Barrier Reef concept
to secure their unclassified networks. The Air Force medical community relies on much
of its network connectivity through the Air Force networks, yet it maintains other
network links to numerous other governmental and civilian organizations. For the Air
Force medical community to comply with Barrier Reef, it will either have to sever its
external links or configure them in such a way that the links meet the requirements of
Barrier Reef. These links are mandated by direction from the office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD(HA)) and support more than 100
automated information systems. To resolve this problem, the OASD(HA) directed the
Tri-Service Infrastructure Management Program Office (TIMPO) to develop a robust,
secure, standards based an infrastructure that will interoperate with the Air Force, Army,
and Navy networks and comply with each Service's network security measures. The
TIMPO is moving forward with that direction. Of concern, however, is that there is not a
clear understanding of all the underlying issues.
This research performed an exploratory study to further clarify the underlying
issues. A framework of these network issues was developed from data collected by
network field experts from the Air Force's major medical centers and the corresponding
base network organizations. The issues from the collected data were compared to issues
considered by TIMPO. The TIMPO plan matched closely to the framework developed
directly from the research. The findings were combined into a single framework. The
vi

composite framework that resulted more completely identifies network issues that any
potential solution to the Air Force medical network dilemma should consider. The
TIMPO plan seems to be on track. It addresses 13 of the 19 identified areas and partially
addresses three other issue areas. The success of the TIMPO plan may be improved if the
remaining issues can be addressed.
The remaining issues include the lack of central management for all military
networks. TIMPO represents the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs, and each Service has its own network controlling authority. No one organization
directs the actions of all of these organizations. Additional issues include more
consideration to social engineering issues, continuity of personnel, dependence of
medical organizations on long-term contract partners. These issues have relevance for
addressing potential network solutions for the Air Force medical community.
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NETWORK SECURITY VERSUS NETWORK CONNECTIVITY:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING THE ISSUES FACING
THE AIR FORCE MEDICAL COMMUNITY

I.

Introduction

In the past decade the Internet and other network activities have become integral
parts of how the Department of Defense (DoD) conducts its official business. During this
time, people intent on stealing, damaging, and destroying military information, or
otherwise impacting its business have increasingly targeted the DoD networks
(GAO/AIMD 96-84; Denning, 1999). Due to the growing dependence on its networks
and the targeting of its systems, the Air Force has placed high importance on securing its
information and networks (Libicki, 1997).
Air Force networks are not totally isolated from the rest of the Internet. As a
result, the Air Force implemented a security plan called Barrier Reef to eliminate
unauthorized access to its networked systems and information. According to
Headquarters Air Force Communications Agency (AFCA) Information Protection
Technical Services Branch,
Protection of information and network resources has become an
essential component of our national defense. This age of network interconnectivity for the completion of our daily business, combined with the
real threat of information warfare from any device linked to the Internet,
has left the Air Force and Department of Defense information resources
vulnerable to denial of service, theft, and destruction. Joint Vision 2010
and the Air Force 21st Century vision document Global Engagement both
confirm the key role of information superiority and call for increased
management and protection of information. The proliferation of dissimilar

protection systems being fielded by individual bases threatens logistical
supportability and has not been successful in increasing the overall
security of Air Force networks. An effort by the Air Force
Communication and Information Center called Operationalizing and
Professionalizing the Network is currently underway to fix these
disconnects. The Barrier Reef, having been established by USAF/SC as
the corporate Air Force concept for boundary protection of our
information networks, provides Air Force professionals a process for
building strong network perimeter defenses. (HQ AFCA/GCIT, 1997)
In a recent message, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force highlighted the importance placed
on protection of Air Force networked systems, as follows:
We need to redouble our efforts to put all networks on our bases behind the
network control centers. The acting secretary [of the Air Force] and I will be
personally reviewing our progress in getting every system on each installation
behind the. network control center and monitored and protected by the tools we
have fielded. (CSAF, 1998)
The Air Force's network security concept of Barrier Reef affords controlled access to Air
Force networks by authorizing users who are specifically granted access by network
administration in accordance with Air Force policy and procedure. This security comes
at a price. While protecting its own networks, the Air Force has not addressed the impact
of this fundamental shift in policy and procedure on other organizations that ride its
networks.
Barrier Reef is in conflict with the operation of the Military Health System
(MHS) (TIMPO, 1999). The MHS delivers health care globally to all military
components and uses/maintains more than 100 medical software applications in support
of this mission (TIMPO, 1999). The Air Force component is the Air Force Medical
Service (AFMS), which uses MHS to support its mission of providing military health
care. Although the AFMS provides these services primarily in support of the Air Force,
and typically resides on Air Force installations, it remains under the jurisdiction of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD(HA)). That is, its budgets,
personnel, and operations all lie under the OASD(HA)'s control (Johnson, 1999).
At the same time, the Air Force medical facilities work in close association with
the bases they support. The main network connectivity for the medical facilities has been
provided (funded and maintained) by the support bases, and other downward-directed
network connections are supported as separate entities. One significant issue in this
regard is interoperability. Prior to the Air Force directive to implement Barrier Reef, the
AFMS was able to operate in a very open network configuration with numerous links to
various governmental and commercial organizations. These other organizations were
allowed direct access to the medical network for contractor provided support services
(e.g. just-in-time medical supply service) for information sharing between military and
commercial medical facilities and other reasons. Barrier Reef, however, directed that this
open access be discontinued. All of the networked systems are protected with a series of
security measures to ensure that only authorized personnel use the systems. To provide
this protection, connectivity to any part of the network must come through the protected
entry point of the Barrier Reef.
This leaves the medical community only two options with respect to its network
connectivity. First, it can take action to comply with the requirements of Barrier Reef
and stay behind that protection. This can be accomplished either by rehoming (changing
the point of connectivity into the network) and reconfiguring its various network
connections to come through the single access point to the protected network or by
discontinuing them. Second, the medical community can isolate itself from the rest of the
base network and operate in isolation. Neither of these options are simple fixes.

Significant investment in time, configuration management, equipment, and other
expensive resources are involved as are various laws, mandates, and contractual
obligations.
The job of rehoming the 100 plus MHS automated information systems (AIS) to
comply with the restrictions of Barrier Reef is a big challenge. They are built to varying
standards, and many are unique, proprietary configurations. Additionally, many of these
legacy systems do not have current levels of security built into them, and the funding to
add it now is not available (TIMPO, 1999). Instead of rebuilding the individual system,
the cheaper, easier, and quicker decision is to secure the infrastructure that these systems
use. There are complications with this idea too. Some of the required MHS AISs use
high-risk protocols that are usually blocked by the base network security because of their
high levels of risk (TIMPO, 1999). If these high-risk protocols are allowed past the
network security measures, the base networks, and in turn the Air Force networks, are at
significant and unnecessary risk. Therefore, another solution is needed.
In essence, the operational Air Force bases and the Air Force medical community
have fundamental differences in their design and purpose. The two entities are also
different from a connectivity perspective. The base information systems are set up in a
flat architecture. They each have connectivity that is essentially independent of every
other base. The MHS links are set up more hierarchically. Many of the Medical AISs
link outlying facilities to regional centers that then relay the information to another
regional center or to another facility within its span of control. That is, the major
(regional) medical centers act as information hubs for all the facilities within a particular
region. The smaller outlying medical facilities link to each other through these hubs and

share information on a variety of activities (Johnson, 1999). This design complicates the
resolution of the MHS dilemma.
The medical centers are being forced to comply with the Air Force direction,
impacting their network association with military units and their trading and commercial
partners. If they do not comply, they will be isolated from the rest of the Air Force
networks and left to deal with their network security issues without the support of the
bases on which they reside. Most of these facilities lack the network equipment,
personnel, and budget to effectively deal with this issue on their own.
The fundamental purpose of base information systems is to provide information in
support of the warfighter while the purpose of the medical service is to facilitate
information sharing in support of patient care. This difference may impact the way in
which the two entities look to resolve the network security issue.
Assumptions and Definitions
The following key terms and concepts are important in this research:
- Air Force Medical Treatment Facilities are Air Force operated
healthcare organizations that include Air Force hospitals and clinics of
varying sizes.
- Air Force Hospitals are Air Force operated medical treatment facilities
that have the capability of caring for inpatients. Air Force hospitals are
hierarchically organized into three categories: medical centers, regional
hospitals, and hospitals, depending on the number of inpatient beds in
the level of staff specialization and ancillary services sophistication.
Air Force hospitals of all sizes also support outpatient clinics that treat
patients not requiring an overnight stay as an inpatient.
- Air Force Medical Centers are Air Force hospitals operating the
largest number of inpatient beds. They also support a number of
medical subspecialties with sophisticated ancillary services. These
facilities receive referral patients from lower-level Air Force hospitals,
provide specialized care and consultation services, and sponsor

residency programs for professional staff members and postgraduate
specialty training.
Barrier Reef is a 12-step process for configuring, monitoring, and
protecting Air Force networks where access to the trusted portion of the
network is restricted to users authorized by the internal network
administration using specific Internet protocols and demonstrating the
proper virtual credentials.
Electronic Commerce describes an expanding world where businesses
deal directly with customers without relying on external value-added
network providers—clearinghouses (Segev, 1998).
Electronic Data Interchange, as defined by private industry and the
American National Standards Institute, is a technique by means of
which formatted, transactional information is moved electronically
from one organization's computer to another's (Payne, 1991).
Firewall is a device that sits between an internal network and the rest
of the network. It filters packets of information as they go by,
according to various criteria settings (TIMPO, 1999).
INFOCONs, or Information Conditions, are designations that let Air
Force organizations know how safe their information exchange systems
are, or if they should be used at all (Loftin, 1998). They work much
like the threat conditions (THREATCONs) that inform personnel of the
current threat of terrorist activity.
Internet Protocol (IP) is the Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE) standard for addressing network nodes and reference
points for establishing network connectivity.
Network Security is comprised of policies, procedures, and
implementation of technical solutions to protect networks assets.
Involves password and administrative management to allow authorized
traffic and deny all else (HQ AFCA/GCIT, 1997)
Partner Access refers to any connection that provides access from the
corporate Intranet to another location outside the organization
(Blackwell, 1999).
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the foundation for digital trust
across an enterprise. (TIMPO, 1999)

Proxy is an application-level gateway that does not allow data packets
to pass directly between two networks. An initial connection is made
with the proxy which determines whether to establish a connection
from the proxy to the requested destination. Proxies can provide
greater security but at the tremendous loss of performance (TIMPO,
1999).
Trusted Agent refers to official users of computer/network systems
who are specifically granted access to the network or network services
by network administration in accordance with Air Force policy and
procedure.
Trusted Network is a network configuration where all authorized users
stay within the virtual confines of the network and communicate with
the outside world by proxy. That is, the network links the user to a
computer or server outside the network and uses that computer to
communicate (as an intermediary). The benefit is that people outside
the network see the proxy as the site generating a link, but in theory that
link can not be traced back to the original user. The original user uses
the IP address of the proxy much as people use post office boxes for
regular mail.

Statement of Problem
Both the Air Force and the Air Force Medical Service (by action of the
OASD(HA)) have been working to address the networking concerns for the past three
years. The Air Force continues to push for security of its systems while the medical
community maintains its need for connectivity, and these two concepts appear not to be
easily resolved. Many organizations have put forth ideas that address one area of interest
or another; however, little research has been done to identify all the relevant areas. This
has resulted in lack of clear understanding of all the issues involved in developing a
solution to the Air Force medical network problem. This thesis collected data from Air
Force major medical center network experts for establishing a framework of issues. The
issues in the framework should be considered for any potential solution to the Air Force

medical community's problem of providing the required network connectivity while
securing its networks.
To do this several areas require investigation. What is the importance of network
security? What is the need for information system connectivity between trading partners?
What is the network security and network connectivity situation for Air Force hospitals?
What possible solutions are being looked at for the Air Force hospitals? Answers to
these question areas may provide further insight into the research problem.

Summary
The Air Force's increased reliance on network connectivity to support its mission
and the rise in attacks on its systems have led the Air Force to implement the restrictive
network security concept of Barrier Reef. The result of this change in procedure has left
the MHS of the medical community with a problem. To stay within the protection
provided by Barrier Reef, the medical community needs to find a way to securely rehome
the various network connections or they must sever them. If it chooses to isolate itself
from the rest of the Air Force networks, the Air Force medical community would need to
develop and maintain its own infrastructure. The purpose of this research is to uncover
the underlying issues of any potential solution to the Air Force medical network dilemma.
Chapter II will cover the current research and general literature relevant to the
area of Air Force and Air Force Medical Service network security and connectivity.
Chapter III will explain the methodology used in this study to establish the framework of
issues that any potential solution to this problem should include. Chapter IV will present
the data analysis and results from the data collected. Chapter V will discuss the findings
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of the study and their relevance to the problem. It will also present limitations of this
study and recommendations for future research.

II.

Literature Review

Introduction
As the Air Force moves to comply with the Air Force Chief of Staffs 1998
mandate to protect all of its networks using Barrier Reef, it is wrestling with the best
manner to maintain needed connectivity to its various elements while protecting its
information and information systems. The Air Force has become reliant on networks and
the Internet for processing and transmitting information almost instantaneously to its
dispersed organizations, to other federal offices and departments, and to outside
organizations and individuals (Dodaro, 1998).
The need of the Air Force major medical centers to comply with Barrier Reef
network security measures while maintaining outside connectivity with its affiliates
requires further investigation. Its open configuration is prompted by downward directed
programs from the Air Force and Department of Defense, and as a natural development
to share information among medical professionals and organizations.

Security as a Necessary Endeavor
Increased Attacks on Information Systems. Attacks on Department of Defense
information technology and networks are on the rise (GAO/AIMD 96-84; Denning,
1999). The same factors that benefit federal operations, speed and accessibility, also
make it possible for individuals and organizations to inexpensively interfere with or
eavesdrop on these operations from remote locations for purposes of fraud or sabotage, or
other malicious intent (Dodaro, 1998). Recent General Accounting Office audit evidence
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indicates that serious and widespread weaknesses in information security are adversely
affecting the United States government's ability to adequately protect critical government
operations, such as national defense. The assets associated with these operations are also
at great risk for fraud, disruption, and inappropriate disclosures (GAO AIMD 98-92).
Another source reported that significant information security weaknesses have been
reported in each of the 24 largest federal agencies, with inadequately restricted access to
sensitive data being the most widely reported problem (Dodaro, 1998).
An earlier report from the General Accounting Office identified attacks on
Defense Department computer systems as a serious and growing threat (GAO AIMD 9684). The same report cited the Defense Information Systems Agency as stating that the
Defense Department may have experienced as many as 250,000 attacks in 1996. This
number is only an estimate based on the actual number of reported attacks and adjusted
for the "estimated" percentage of reported versus actual attacks (Smith, 1998). Even so,
the high number of estimated individual attacks indicates that the Department of Defense
is high interest target. Research indicates the number of reported cases is only a small
fraction of the actual number of attacks that take place (CERT, 1999; GAO AIMD 96-84;
Adams C, 1997).
According to Defense Information Systems Agency estimates, nearly two-thirds
(65%) of all the estimated attacks were successful in breaching networked government
systems (GAO AIMD 96-84). It also reports that the number of attacks is doubling each
year as the size of the Internet increases and as the capabilities of hackers and hacker
tools improve (GAO AIMD 96-84). Other assessments report different findings. The
national-level Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Coordination Center
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receives incident reports from both the public and private sector. Statistics provided by
the CERT Coordination Center indicate that the number of incidences the Center handled
rose dramatically from 1988 through 1994 but reached a plateau in that year. Table 1
reflects these findings, as well as the significant increase reported in the first three
quarters of 1999.
Table 1. Computer Emergency Response Team Statistics, 1988 - 1999
YEAR

Number of Incidences
Handled

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

6
132
252
406
773
1334
2340
2412
2573
2134
3734
6844
Total: 22,940

1999 (Quarters 1,2,3)

Effects of Attacks. The impact of computer system attacks can vary greatly.
Cosmetic alteration of public access web pages, effectively graffiti on the Internet, is
typically a nuisance crime. This type of attack alters very little data and can be
perpetrated without gaining access to the entire system. Correction of these actions often
requires minimal effort. However, other effects such as reduced trust and reliability
concerns harbored by users of the information may be a greater problem. Some
companies may be more concerned by the loss of customer confidence and its impact on
future business (Stackpole, 1998).
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A greater potential impact from a network attack is denial of service. A denial of
service attack is defined as an incident in which a user or organization is deprived of a
network service or resource that would normally be available (Denning, 1999). Affected
resources could include electronic databases, mail service or Web site access
(Whatis.com, 1999). This denial can result from many different factors such as computer
virus, hacker attack, sabotage, hardware failure, natural disaster, an accident, or operator
error. Whatever the cause, these loss-of-service attacks force one to conduct business
without the support of automated systems (Stackpole, 1998). The effect of these attacks
can vary greatly depending on the operating procedures of the organization and the extent
to which the organization is dependent on the lost services. Additionally, there are valid
concerns with respect to liability, or collateral losses, that are often associated with denial
of service and data loss/theft costs. These liabilities may include fines for violating
regulatory directives or civil penalties for failing to exercise due care.
In addition to loss of access to networks and networked data, another concern is
the loss of data due to theft. Some data is highly desired, and the risk of theft for that
data can be affected by the precautions taken. If an information system is left
unprotected, an attacker can simply use software programs or other means to intercept,
read, and redirect the data that he desires. The impact of the theft will vary. The impact
of losing a single set of data may mean anything from not properly handling a $10
transaction to Coca-Cola's® secret formula being compromised. Attackers may choose
instead to destroy or corrupt data using malicious logic or some other means of
manipulation. Just as with data theft, the action of corrupting and destroying data can be
accomplished without detection. The impact of these actions can have varied results.

13

At best, these attacks are a multimillion-dollar nuisance to the Defense
Department; at worst, they are a serious threat to national security (GAO AIMD 96-84).
Attackers have already gained access to critical information that could affect our work
and capability. They have seized control of entire Defense systems, many of which
support critical functions, such as weapons systems research and development, logistics,
and finance. Attackers have also stolen, modified, and destroyed data and software (GAO
AIMD 96-84).
During the Gulf War, five hackers from the Netherlands penetrated computer
systems at 34 Air Force military sites, including some that directly supported operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The attackers were able to access information about
precise troop locations, armament, capabilities, and movement of American naval vessels
in the Gulf region. Unconfirmed reports also disclose that the Dutch hackers tried to sell
the information to Iraq during the Gulf War conflict. Based on information he said was
received from government officials, Eugene Shultz, then manager of the Department of
Energy's Computer Incident Advisory Capability, reported to the British Broadcasting
Corporation that Saddam Hussein had been offered the data through an intermediary.
(Denning, 1999)
This is not an isolated incident. A General Accounting Office report recounted
another well-publicized incident: an attack on Rome Laboratory, the Air Force's premier
command and control research facility. Two hackers took control of laboratory support
systems, established links to foreign Internet sites, and stole tactical and artificial
intelligence research data. The potential for catastrophic damage is high. Organized
foreign nationals or terrorists could use information warfare techniques to disrupt military
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operations by harming command and control systems, public switch networks, and other
systems or networks on which the DOD relies. (GAO AIMD 96-84)
Due to these continual onslaughts and known vulnerabilities, the Department of
Defense has directed several security actions including protection, detection, and
reporting of these cases. Based on this direction, the Air Force has initiated numerous
protective measures for its computer networks. As a basis for developing these protective
measures, understanding our vulnerabilities and the capabilities of our attackers are
critical factors. In the words of Sun Tzu, "Know your enemy and know yourself (Sun
Tzu Translation by Griffith, 1963).
Methods of Attacking Networks. Much research has also been done to analyze
the type and purpose of various attacks against networked systems (Blackwell, 1999;
Dodaro, 1998; Howard, 1997, etc.). Depending on the nature of our adversary's intent,
an attacker tends to take the precautions he feels are necessary to evade detection and
prosecution (Caldwell, 1990). Insider attacks are reported to be the most prevalent and
are estimated at 70 - 80 percent of all attacks (Debreceny, 1998). The attacks in this case
may involve theft, damage, etc. to data the attacker has authorized access to. The attacks
may also extend to unauthorized areas. These attacks are often more successful because
much of the network security efforts is focused on keeping unauthorized people from
gaining access to the system (Debreceny, 1998). Insiders bypass these outward looking
measures.
The other avenue of attack involves attacks from outside the organization. These
external attacks can be straightforward from the attackers computer system to the target
system. However, to decrease the likelihood of being caught, the attacker can use a
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technique called looping, where a number of intermediate systems are penetrated en route
to the target system, to escape detection (Caldwell, 1990). The ability to involve
intermediate systems and even to cross international boundaries further obscures the
situation.
These attacks can occur in forms of varying complexity. A common means of
performing an indirect attack is for an adversary to gain access to some third party's
system and to use that system as a platform from which to launch an attack. Using one
intermediate system is the most basic form of an indirect attack. One well-known
example is the attack for which Kevin Mitnick, an infamous hacker of government
systems, was eventually imprisoned:
The attack began on another system—one owned by a colleague of
Shimomura's—the authorized user whose system was the intended target.
There the attacker looked for "trusted relationships" between this machine
and other machines, such as Shimomura's. Once these were determined,
the attacker broke into Shimomura's machine by using the other machine's
address, pretending to be his colleague's machine. To cover his tracks, the
attacker occupied the trusted machine with spurious requests to keep it
from issuing error messages. Once the machine was broken into, the
attacker installed software to assist in future illicit use of the station. The
entire attack took less than 16 seconds. (Fisher, 1995)
Since the Department of Defense and other government agencies maintain the
capability to trace an attack through multiple systems, its adversaries have employed the
concept of looping to help hide their trail (Fisher, 1995; Denning, 1999). To further
complicate tracing these individuals, the attackers can employ intermediate systems in a
number of foreign countries. This inhibits the Federal government's ability to trace the
attacker back to the source by involving international law and sovereign rights of these
foreign countries.
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Even if the attacks come from within the United States, the government is limited
in the action it can take. The government must take steps not to violate the rights of its
citizenry. In the Department of Defense's case, it is not allowed to take any action
against citizens of United States. The privacy rights of the United States citizenry
impede the tracing of attackers if they use a third party's system to facilitate an attack.
Permission for access to and monitoring of intermediate systems must be gained by law
enforcement official from the lawful owners. The law does not currently allow for use of
"hot pursuit" to circumvent these restrictions. Thus, preventing successful attacks
becomes even more important.
Risk Management. Federal agencies must take steps to understand their
information security risks and implement policies and controls to reduce these risks
(GAO/AIMD-96-110, 1996). In September 1996, the GAO reported that a broad array of
federal operations was at risk due to information security weaknesses A common
underlying cause for these vulnerabilities was inadequate security program management
(GAO/AIMD-96-110, 1996). In that report, GAO recommended that the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) play a more proactive role in leading federal
improvement efforts, in part through its role as chair of the Chief Information Officers
(CIO) Council. Subsequently, in a February 1997 series of reports to the Congress, the
GAO designated information security as a new government-wide high-risk issue
(GAO/AIMD-96-110, 1996). More recently, in its March 31, 1998 report on the Federal
government's consolidated financial statements, the GAO reported that widespread
computer control deficiencies also contribute to problems in Federal financial
management because they diminish confidence in the reliability of financial management
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data (Dodaro, 1998). Clearly these are significant areas of concern that needed to be
addressed.
Threat Identification. The first step in the process of risk management is risk
assessment. This step involves the identification of assets to protect, the threat to those
assets, the extent of the vulnerability, the likelihood ofthat threat coming to fruition, the
loss that could result, and the potential safeguards that could be installed (Denning,
1999). Management must ensure that information security measures are appropriate in
relation to the value of the assets and the threats to which they are vulnerable (Hayes and
Ulrich, 1998). The security of information assets, with regard to the value of their
confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and the security of the supporting information
technology resources must be assured by well-informed owners, managers, custodians, or
other responsible parties (IISF, 1999).
Research indicates a few discrete sources for the external threat to networked
information systems: access to the system by hackers, infiltration of a system with
malicious logic, access to the system by competitors, and damage caused by natural
disaster (Loch, 1992, Denning, 1999). All of these concerns must be considered in terms
of the damage that can result, and the preventive actions that can be put into place.
Proportionality Principle. The Generally Accepted System Security Principle
(GASSP) of proportionality establishes the importance of balancing the security
precautions taken to the risks of modification, denial of use, or disclosure of the
information. In essence, security controls should be commensurate with the value of the
information assets and the vulnerability. The value, sensitivity, and criticality of the
information, and the probability, frequency, and severity of direct and indirect harm or
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loss must be considered. This principle recognizes the value of approaches to
information security ranging from prevention to acceptance. (IISF, 1999)
Some organizations determine information security measures based on an
examination of the risks, associated threats, vulnerabilities, loss exposure, and risk
mitigation through cost/benefit analysis using a Risk Management Framework. Other
organizations implement information security measures based on a prudent assessment of
"due care" (such as the use of reasonable safeguards based on the practices of similar
organizations), resource limitations, and priorities. (IISF, 1999)
Periodic Reassessment. The nature of the network environment is constantly
changing. New information needs, dynamic cooperative associations, and rapid
technological advances are driving those changes. To stay up to date, all network
security measures, policies, and procedures should be periodically reviewed for currency
and completeness (IISF, 1999). Risks to the information, to its value, and to the
probability, frequency, and severity of direct and indirect harm/loss should also undergo
periodic assessment to identify and measure the variances from available and established
security measures and controls (IISF, 1999). Based on findings in the reassessment,
management can then make an informed risk management decision whether to accept,
mitigate, or transfer the identified risks with due consideration of cost effectiveness (IISF,
1999). The list below provides some guidelines for when a reassessment is warranted:
Events that may trigger the need for a security assessment:
0

A significant change to the information system
° A significant change in the information or its value
0
A significant change in the technology
0
A significant change to the threats or vulnerabilities
° A significant change to available safeguards
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° A significant change in the user profiles
° A significant change in the potential loss of the system
° A significant change to the organization/enterprise
° A predetermined length of time since last assessment
(IISF, 1999)
Network security is a critical success factor in electronic commerce. The
government has been better able to allocate funds to upgrade security for its information
systems than has each element of the private sector. Many businesses have become quite
skilled at protecting critical business information (patents, research and development,
formulas, etc.) but typically have not allocated the resources to apply the same defensive
capability throughout their enterprises (Segev, 1998).
IBM has taken network security steps similar to the Air Force's Barrier Reef
concept. IBM has developed a 4-step checklist to help its customers perform risk
assessment for their networked systems and take action for mitigating that risk
(McMullen, 1998). McMullen details how this IBM checklist can form the basis of an
integrated security policy. First, Know your [organization's] value and what
information needs to be protected. This requires the organization to be able to assign
worth to its information. Second, Know your network; this involves knowing all the
systems entry/exit points. Many organizations run into security problems by not knowing
how the system is linked to the outside world: modems, secondary network connections,
etc. Additionally, many organizations only look to external sources when addressing
vulnerabilities. As noted previously, 70 - 80 percent of all system abuses and network
incidents can be attributed to internal threats (Debreceny, 1998). Third, Know the
threats; this means keeping abreast of vendor-specific advisories and technological
advances. Another possible source of vulnerability is from added interactivity between
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the organization and its suppliers and customers. Fourth, Know your plan; here the
importance of having a planned response to network problems that may occur is stressed.
Proper planning for a virus or intrusion may allow for a more thorough reaction and
allows for controlling the situation with minimal impact to the organization (McMullen,
1998)
Other efforts to establish fundamental guidelines for promoting effective network
security have produced promising results. The International Information Security
Foundation-Sponsored Committee developed and distributed Generally Accepted System
Security Principles throughout the international community (ISSF, 1999). The principles
form a framework that addresses many of the same concerns identified by the
Department of Defense. The committee paid considerable attention to the role of
management in establishing network security measures. It states that an organization's
management shall ensure that policy and supporting standards, baselines, procedures, and
guidelines are developed and maintained to address all aspects of information security.
Specifically, the organizational management should consider the potential impact on the
shared global infrastructure, e.g., the Internet, public-switched networks, and other
connected systems when establishing network security measures. Another method of
improving network security in support of electronic commerce is encryption.
Encryption. One strategy that may help reduce the risk posed by attackers is to
keep a "low profile" on electronic networks and limit disclosure of security measures.
Publicizing the robustness of a network's security measures only seems to invite hackers
to attack the security system (Fotsch, 1996). In addition to the proliferation of
management policies and procedures, many software and hardware developments have
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enabled better protection of networked systems. Since the theft of information that
resides on computer/network systems typically has been of interest for attackers, one
mechanism for furthering the protection of network assets has been the development of
robust encryption tools. Encryption in this area affords two main benefits: protection of
data in transit and protection ofthat data as it resides on the network in servers or in other
forms of data storage.
These practices have definite applicability in supporting both public and private
sector networks. The National Security Agency, in collaboration with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology, has developed the National Information
Assurance Partnership (NIAP) which will meet the security requirements of both
producers and users of security products and services. The NIAP initiative will help both
public- and private-sector users to evaluate, compare, and select the security products and
services that best meet their needs. Moreover, the Department of Defense is in the
process of establishing an integrated, Department-wide Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
to provide a foundation for security services at multiple levels of assurance for secure
interoperability within the DoD and with the Department's federal, allied, and
commercial partners. The PKI refers to a means by which users can, with confidence,
securely and privately exchange data and conduct other network transactions. This is
done using a pair of electronic, encrypted keys (one public and one private) that are
obtained and shared through a trusted authority. The public key is the foundation for
establishing digital trust across the network (TIMPO, 1999).
Costs versus Benefits. One of the main focuses of business as it engages in
economic activity is the concept of return on investment; and this return can be based on
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both tangible benefits, such as income, and on intangibles, such as name recognition
(Gwartney and Stroup, 1997). This determination is based on some form of assessment.
With respect to this research, the assessment deals with weighing the benefits of
computer/network security against the expense of the security and the potential loss (or
risk) with respect to the system and the networked data. Organizations will make choices
for how they will manage and mitigate the risk. Given the nature of for-profit
organizations, these decisions need to be justifiable based on economic rationale.
Organizations make business decisions not only on how to mitigate the risk of attack but
also on economic impact of reporting or disclosing that attack and the loss incurred
(Adams, 1998).
Additionally, there are valid concerns with respect to liability, or collateral losses,
that are often associated with denial of service and data loss/theft costs. These liabilities
may include fines for violating regulatory directives or civil penalties for failing to
exercise due care. Some companies may be more concerned by the loss of customer
confidence and the corresponding impact on future business than on the actual delays and
other costs resulting from the attack (Stackpole, 1998).
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is a basis for electronic partnerships. A
common method for supporting the interchange between organizations is Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI). It is the application of computer technology designed to enhance
productivity by migrating private and public sector businesses to a domain based solely
on electronic transactions (Cohen, 1989). Electronic Data Interchange is the electronic
exchange of formatted business transactions between one organization's computer system
and another's computer system. These transactions are structured in such a way that the
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computers recognize and process the transactions without the need for human
intervention (Payne, 1991).
Another way to define EDI is by making a distinction between it and electronic
commerce. Electronic data interchange is the inter-process (computer application to
computer application) communication of business information in a standardized
electronic form. Electronic Commerce includes EDI, but recognizes the need for interpersonal (human to human) and human to computer communications, the transfer of
moneys, and the sharing of common databases as additional activities that aid in the
efficient conduct of business. By incorporating a wide range of technologies, EC is much
broader than EDI. (Houser, 1996)
The use of EDI in the private sector has developed more rapidly than that in the
public sector including the Department of Defense. Its use in the government began in
the transportation industry during the 1960's (Payne, 1991). However, the Department of
Defense is now working with the concept of EDI. This follows a Deputy Secretary of
Defense directive that EDI was to become the standard for conducting business with the
Department of Defense. As a result, the Department of Defense formed an Electronic
Data Interchange Standards Management Committee to conduct major research
initiatives and to investigate how and where to best integrate EDI into Department of
Defense activities and what benefits would be anticipated (EDISMC, 1999).
The Goal of Electronic Data Interchange. The Department of Defense goal for
EDI is to provide a common method of interchangeability of EDI transactions with its
suppliers (EDISMC, 1999). This requires the use of common data formats for EDI
information, the definition of the network architecture to be used to provide two-way
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access between the DoD its EDI partners. It also demands the assurance that the
expected volume of traffic is supportable given existing and planned network capacities
(Payne, 1991). One trend in the HMS world is to establish EDI relationships with
commercial vendors wherever it is suitable (TIMPO, 1999). Services for medical
supplies, pharmaceuticals, and even nutritional medicine are areas where the Air Force
medical community already has EDI relationships (Johnson, 1999),
One of the key findings about the Department of Defense's implementation of
Electronic Data Interchange is that using a standardized EDI format facilitates interoperability of DoD systems. By minimizing, or in some cases eliminating the need for
translation between Department of Defense data formats and those of its private sector
partners, the speed and reliability of the data exchange significantly increase (Payne,
1991). Research identifies electronic mail as the preferable mode for handling EDI
transaction (Payne, 1991). An exception to using electronic mail for EDI is for high
volume, longstanding transactional relationships between a Department of Defense
agency and the supplier or contractor, or for specific security reasons (Payne, 1991).
This has specific implications for the Air Force medical community as it continues with
its EDI relationships. In order to achieve the benefits of this automated process, the Air
Force medical community must manage and protect this system.
Inter-organizational Trust. The cooperative relationship between these
governmental agencies and private sector businesses continues to grow as the partners
become more interdependent. The government has many providers with whom it can
maintain an arms-length relationship; but more and more, it is becoming tightly coupled
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with key business partners. As this happens a relationship based on inter-organizational
trust emerges.
"Security is fundamentally about people—those who develop, operate and
use your systems. And there are only two types of people—those who
have earned your trust and those you haven't caught yet." (Walsh, 1998)
The concept of trust is critical when assessing risk in that the existence of trust enables
people to take risks (Jarvenpaa, 1998). From an information perspective, the Department
of Defense continues to restrict access based on trust and the concept of "need to know."
Trust can also be explained as perceived (1) ability, (2) benevolence, and (3)
integrity. Here, ability refers to the skills that enable the trusted person to be perceived
competent within some context. Benevolence is the extent to which a trusted person is
believed to be caring and concerned, and to be willing to do good to the trustor. Integrity
is adherence to a set of principles thought to make the trusted person dependable and
reliable, from the trustor's point of view (Jarvenpaa, 1998). Webster's Dictionary
defines trust in the following manner:
Trust: To place confidence in; to rely on, to confide in, or repose faith in.
To risk; to venture confidently.
(1998 Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary)
However, the idea of inter-organizational trust opens up another issue of risk.
Some risk can be better managed when it is restricted to within the organization. Internal
issues such as who is hired, who holds certain positions, and who has access to
information, networks, etc., allow the organization to use its own policies and business
rules to mitigate risk. In a relationship between organizations, some of this control is
lost. The idea of inter-organizational trust, becomes a way for organizations to deal with
this risk.
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Research indicates that the closeness or dependence of the two parties has an
effect on the development of trust (Grundy, 1998). The richness of the media in which
the relationship develops is also of importance. Studies have demonstrated that videoteleconferencing, for example, significantly benefits the development of trust (Heberlie
and Tolbert, 1999), even to the point of negatively affecting actions and decision making
(Grundy, 1998).
The decisions involved in granting trust to individuals are driven by the business
rules of the organization (Grundy, 1998). The decision to trust may be to turn a blind eye
and hope that one's trust is not misplaced. It may also be built upon careful examination
of to whom trust is granted and under what circumstances. Additionally, trust can be
seen as situation dependent (Holland, 1998). For example, if you allow a person into
your home and you do not lock your door, you have granted some measure of trust to that
person. If, however, you lock the door to your home to protect its contents, then for the
person you allow inside, you would seem to grant some greater measure of trust. That is,
the trust requirement to allow someone behind a protective barrier may be higher.
Another example is how the Department of Defense restricts access to certain
information to persons demonstrating proper clearance and a "need to know."
The closing off or securing of Air Force networks has been mandated to help
protect what has become recognized as a mission critical resource, even as a weapon
system (AFCIC, 1999). In order to effectively protect its information and information
systems, the Air Force is restricting access to its networks to what are commonly called
trusted agents. For the Air Force, this means restricting access to military and civilian
members of the armed forces, members of other U.S. government agencies, and certain
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contractors and trading partners/affiliates that operate within authorized network
domains. At issue then is how an Air Force major medical center and its contract agents
and trading partners fits into this overall picture.
The granting of trust is a serious measure of risk management. In granting trust,
there is a risk that the trust will be violated. By trusting personnel behind network
protection the Air Force is taking a risk, but that trust is sometimes necessary for
cooperative relationships between organizations.
Over the last decade, the increasing prevalence of co-operative behavior of
"economic partners" has furthered the importance of trust as an integral part of any
business strategy (Holland, 1998). As a result, organizations have developed methods for
working with customers, suppliers, competitors, banks and other economic partners that
rely much more on the development of trust and long-term business relationships (Naude
and Holland, 1996) even to the point of developing strategic alliances. Development of
this strategic trust is central to the development of the relationship; however, this is a
concept that is difficult to clearly delineate given that each relationship is unique (Hart
and Estrin, 1991). These interactions between organizations cannot be completely
regulated by contracts that characterize market-style transactions nor by standard rules of
ownership (Williamson, 1991).
Partner Access. One critical manifestation of inter-organizational trust comes in
the determination of how inter-organizational access is granted in a secure network
environment (Blackwell, 1999). Blackwell followed up this statement with a definition
of partner access given by Michele Crabb, computer systems analyst for Cisco Systems
who discussed partners' access at the Intranet Security Panel at Uniforum '97. There she
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defined partner access as any connection that provides access from the corporate Intranet
to another location outside the organization. (Blackwell, 1999)
The connection is typically configured based on the unique nature of the
relationship and on the network security requirements of the two systems. She also
addressed specific security concerns that must be addressed in coping with partner
access:
° Security depends on the partner company—if not properly controlled on both
ends, there could be major vulnerabilities.
0
Access needs of the partner company may change over time
° The personnel at the partner organization are dynamic; reliance must be placed
on the partner to grant and maintain access for only current users.
° There is never time to do proper analysis and implement controls with integrity;
they are always needed immediately.
0
As the number of partners multiplies, managing all the connections becomes an
administrative nightmare.
(Blackwell, 1999)
These problems can be minimized by knowing the partner organizations well and
having well-defined guidelines and expectations. Initial policies and guidelines should be
as strict as is reasonable since it is easier to loosen than restrict them later. All partner
connections must be documented in detail including the names of the contact persons for
each party. Needs should be reviewed on a frequent basis, and future growth taken into
consideration. The military has the ability to mandate and enforce these standards
through contracts with its commercial and trading partners, as long as the "restrictive
provisions or conditions are necessary to satisfy the needs of the military or as authorized
by law" (Arnavas and Ruberry, 1994).
People in the Loop. It has never been sufficient to entrust risk control and
protection to machines, no matter how advanced. People are critical to the effort and as a
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result are a liability. The decisions and actions of people can affect the successful
application of information technology security measures. The employment of competent
personnel is critical to the success of network security. The employees need to have
sufficient knowledge and technical skill to perform their roles reliably, to comply with
organizational requirements, and to maintain the proper controls on the network (IISF,
1999). These criteria should be evaluated for all personnel who access, control, and
manage the information and information systems.
All of these issues revolve around the need for network security. The ability to
interact successfully in a network environment is in some way affected by how protected
the data is from theft and corruption. It is also impacted by how protected the systems
themselves are to support the operations required of them. The use of these systems has
become prevalent in the business world.

Increased Use of Information Systems for Business/Hospital Systems
Information systems are useful in the conduct of many business activities. These
systems are used to support just-in-time delivery of products to minimize the business
costs of storing finished goods and materials. They offer convenience for handling
billing and other office automation functions. Benefits abound in how data warehousing
and data mining can provide businesses with critical insight to consumer trends, payment
risks, likes and dislikes (McFadden, et al, 1999). The list of functions is long. One of
the uses of business information systems is to learn about consumers and provide them
with what they want so as to gain a competitive edge in the marketplace (Gwartney,
1997). Hospitals have also found use for information systems. For the Air Force medical
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community, the MHS supports many of the hospital services (TIMPO, 1999). Medical
logistics packages track the location and status of a hospital's patients.
The problems of network security and information protection are not restricted to
government systems or organizations. The civilian sector has also been subject to
attacks. Like the United States government, the civilian sector is also not allowed to take
the law into its own hands (e.g. attacking the intruder to their systems). Businesses are
left with identifying and reporting attacks and incidences to the proper authorities. As a
result, they too must focus on shoring up the defense of their computer/network systems.
Attacks are on the rise. Just as in the public sector, attacks on the private sector
are also on the rise (CERT, 1999). The attacks on private-sector systems are not a new
problem; however, disclosure of those attacks is new. Companies and businesses of
varying size have not seen fit to report attacks on their systems even when those attacks
resulted in theft of even millions of dollars, intellectual or patented property. Again fear
of a loss of reputation outweighs the loss from the attack. In light of the government's
recent network security problems, it has begun to push for increased network security
capability for both public and private organizations.

Air Force Hospital Scenario
The Air Force medical community is torn between providing an open trusting
relationship with its partners and the need to protect its own systems (Futch, 1999).
Many of the 100 plus systems of the MHS work on a significant degree of interorganizational trust. That is, the interconnectedness of the Air Force medical networks
provides partners direct access to more than just the MHS system being shared (Johnson,
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1999). This community has also built EDI relationships with commercial contractors.
The reordering of medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and food stuffs for nutritional
medicine (for the medical dining facilities) is often handled as EDI transactions (Johnson,
1999).
The Air Force medical community conducts its daily operations in a similar
fashion to a civilian health management organization (HMO). That different mission
requires a degree of network openness that creates additional risk to the Air Force
organizations with which Air Force medical networks interconnect (Johnson,. 1999).
That is not to say that the medical networks do not need protecting. In fact, Presidential
Directive 63 stipulates that medical information and information systems are critical
resources that need to be protected apart from other networks (TIMPO, 1999). As a
result of this directive, the Tri-Service Infrastructure Management Program Office
(TIMPO) was established under the Department of Defense Health Affairs to pursue
various initiatives to isolate and protect the medical service networks. TIMPO was
created as an outcome of the Health Affairs reorganization of 1996. This reorganization
identified TIMPO as the office responsible for the development and implementation of a
Tri-Service medical networks infrastructure (Futch, 1999). The challenge to TIMPO is to
provide an infrastructure that is robust, secure, standards based, and interoperable with
the existing security of the three Services. To do this, TIMPO has been developing a
broad systems architecture that is heavily influenced by the Defense Information
Infrastructure (DII) (TIMPO, 1999). The Air Force medical community's responsibility
in this endeavor is significant. It is primarily involved with the architectural and
engineering design, security engineering, WWW management, and the overall
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implementation and training support for the entire program (Johnson, 1999). The driving
force behind this new direction has been the proliferation of military treatment facility
(MTF) networks and the various clinical and office automation systems that ride the
infrastructure (SRA Vol 1, 1998).
Other Impacts. The process of increasing the protection of Air Force networks
has had repercussions throughout the Air Force medical community. When the Air Force
designated its networks as a weapon system, the Air Force medical and legal
communities identified a significant the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) concern. The
potential problem with this designation lays in the fact that medical personnel and
facilities are protected from attack in their roles as non-combatants (LOAC, 1999). The
LOAC states that a non-combatant can be treated as a combatant if that person used a
weapon (LOAC, 1999). If the Air Force networks are identified as weapons, what are the
repercussions to the Air Force medical cornmunity? This issue is still under review.

Air Force Network Security Efforts
The Department of Defense has focused its efforts toward defending its networks
systems from attack. The Air Force has measures in place to protect not only classified
systems, but also its unclassified computer/information systems. In 1995, the Air Force
allocated more than $80 million toward defensive network security measures. These
funds were used to establish a base network control center at each Air Force installation
to protect access to computers and communications and to monitor network activity with
the intent of identifying and tracking system intruders (Fogleman, 1995). In 1998, the
highest ranking communications officer in the Air Force, Lieutenant General William J.
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Donahue, proclaimed that all Air Force information systems should be designated as
mission critical systems, and as such, should be protected with the same diligence as
other Air Force weapon systems (AFCIC, 1999).
The goal of this network security is to maintain operability as well as provide for
overall network security. According to Anita Jones, Director of Defense Research and
Engineering for the Department of Defense Science and Technology Program, Defensive
Information Warfare (IWD) is a high priority. She acknowledged that the Department of
Defense now has broader focused systems that will survive under unfriendly behavior"
(Adams, 1997). An extreme and expensive consideration would be to have the
Department of Defense protect the publicly switched networks. The rationale for this
goes back to the fact that approximately 95 percent of all DoD connections ride the
publicly switched networks (Denning, 1999). The likelihood ofthat approach is minimal
given current national policy (Adams, 1997).
Barrier Reef. As a result of this shift in policy, the Air Force Communications
Agency (AFCA) at Scott Air Force Base IL, was directed to develop plans and
procedures for protecting the Air Force information systems. AFCA developed a 12-step
process to establish effective network security at all Air Force installations. As stated
earlier, this protection is called Barrier Reef. It centers around the idea that effective
network security is not developed piecemeal, but rather as the concerted effect of
policies, procedures, and technical solutions (Segev, 1998). According to the
Information Technologies branch at Headquarters Air Force Communications Agency,
"Barrier Reef is the electronic equivalent of the physical perimeter defense
provided on our Air Force bases by our security forces. Proxies and
firewalls will act as electronic gate guards inspecting traffic and allowing
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only the traffic that is authorized. Host-based security for base customers
within the base perimeter will continue to be the responsibility of the
functional community, but portions of the Air Force Base Information
Protection effort will assist in providing additional host security.
Functional communities with a security policy requirement more stringent
than the agreed base policy can augment Barrier Reef security with
additional network protection. Functional communities that are unwilling
or unable to comply with the stated network security policy will be rehomed outside the Barrier Reef perimeter." (AFCA/GCIT, 1997)
This 12-step process is broken down as follows:
1.

"Know thyself."
A. Identify and reduce exterior network access points to a
manageable number
B. Conduct traffic analysis to determine protocols and data rates
currently supported
C. Map your network topology (physical and logical)
D. Create a list of base customers including network administration
points of contact and network information

2. Requirements determination
A. Determine what traffic types and what access points are required
to network
B. Understand the uniqueness of each installation/base
3. Policy formation
A. Create a base level network security policy, involving all tenants
in functional areas
B. Enumerate all allowable services; deny all others
C. Review AFSSI 5024 for guidance on writing security policy
4. Packet filtering
A. Take advantage of existing router access control list capabilities
B. Block as many unsafe services as possible based on TCP/IP
headers
C. View a graphical representation
5. Network monitoring
A. Integrate network monitoring device(s) such as the Automated
Security Incident Monitor (ASIM) developed by the Air Force
Information Warfare Center (AFIWC)
B. Place the monitoring device outside of the boundary protection to
monitor all attempted attacks

35

6. Network time sourcing
A. protect base from the injection of false time (as from spoofing of
Network Tithe Protocol)
B. Integrate GPS receivers to provide a reliable, accurate time source
for base systems
7. Consolidating dial-in communications
A. Aggregate multiple functional dial-in solutions into one
centralized service
B. Protect access to the service via strong authentication of users
8. Worldwide Web proxying
A. Direct all outgoing worldwide Web requests through a worldwide
Web proxy device for the purpose of
i. Hiding users' identities from Internet eavesdroppers
ii. Reducing wide area network utilization and improving user
response time
iii. Providing positive control over Web access to unauthorized
sites
9.

Inter/intra services
A. Provide a public "lobby" for e-mail entry and access to data for
wide distribution
B. Place in the protected boundary protection zone to reduce internal
network access
C. Provide a mechanism to keep public data updated from internal
web servers

10.

Proxies of common and special services
A. Authenticate outsiders before granting access for dangerous
services (Telnet, FTP)
B. Implement controlled access for specialized Air Force services
(e.g. Info Connect, CHCS)

11.

Network concealment and security
A. With all network traffic, use proxies to interact with systems
outside the network, hides internal IP addresses
B. Consider migration of IP version 6 or a 10.0.0.0 class A private
network to seal "backdoor" leaks

12.

Training, maintaining, and certifying
A. Use logs, monitoring tools, and CERT advisories to identify new
vulnerabilities
B. Update access control lists, proxies, and authentication measures
to oppose the threats
C. Perform system certification to ensure proper accreditation
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D. Keep system administrators trained
Effective network security is a combination of policies, procedures and technical
solutions (Segev, 1998) and Barrier Reef provides these.
Detecting, reporting, and responding to attacks. The protective barriers are an
essential part of network security; however, there is more required to adequately protect
Air Force networks. The Air Force Information Warfare Center developed the means to
track computer systems that enter an Air Force network's cyberspace (Cloutier, 1996).
This tool, the Automated Security Incident Measurement (ASIM), is able to track and
report intrusion attempts and possible internal abuses. It resides outside a base's virtual
front door—the entry point for all traffic onto the base network. Recent upgrades to the
ASIM monitoring system immediately alert network administrators to unauthorized or
suspicious activity. Previous editions of the software only compiled reports every 12
hours delaying the effective response to what might be a network attack. With ASIM
monitoring, network administrators can identify network addresses that the unauthorized
person uses to access into the Air Force network. They can then act to deny access from
these addresses. Essentially, tools such as ASIM help Air Force network administrators
achieve the goal of blocking access to networks from unauthorized addresses even as
someone from that point attempts to gain access to its network (AFI 33-115,1997).
Governmental Response Teams. In addition to local monitoring and responding
mechanisms, the Air Force has developed a centralized team to disseminate time critical
information to all of its installations. This team is called the Air Force Computer
Emergency Response Team, or AFCERT. The AFCERT has direct links to its United
States government counterpart, the national CERT. Together with other representatives
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of 30 international teams, comprise the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
(FIRST). These teams are responsible for collecting information on existing threats and
vulnerabilities and for determining courses of action for the protection of all government
computer/networked systems within their purview (Mesevich, 1996). The Defense
Information Systems Agency has also formed a special Information Security (INFOSEC)
team to oversee the procurement of necessary protective technologies (Military Newswire
Service, 1996).

The Dilemma
The Air Force has instituted Barrier Reef as the series of security measures to
protect its networks. The Air Force medical community operates mandated network
connectivity that is not compatible with Barrier Reef. To overcome this problem, the
OASD(HA) directed TIMPO to develop an architecture that would protect all military
medical systems and allow the systems to continue with existing connectivity
requirements. More effort is needed to understand the issues involved with this dilemma.
This research will establish a framework of significant issues that should be considered
by any activity meant to solve the dilemma.

Possible Solutions for the Security-Connectivity Dilemma
In 1998, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 63, "Critical
Infrastructure Protection" identifying OASD(HA) as a Critical Asset Owner in the
Defense Information Infrastructure. This direction made the OASD(HA) solely
responsibility for medical information assurance. Additionally, it expressly relieved the
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operational military from responsibility and accountability for protecting medical
computer applications or the medical network infrastructure (TIMPO, 1999). One
interesting effect of this directive is that the Air Force community and its leadership can
choose to cut their network ties to the medical systems. As noted earlier, medical
information systems rely on their host bases for communications and computer support.
In response to the new authority, the OASD(HA) directed the Tri-Service
Management Program Office to establish corrective action (TIMPO, 1999). The TIMPO
charter was to establish a robust, secure, standards based architecture that was
interoperable and consistent with the security measures of each service (Futch, 1999).
The focus of the design has been on the use of encryption, and state-of-the-art protocols
and hardware tools. Table 2 identifies various issues the plan addresses.

Table 2. Issues covered by TIMPO
Major Issues
Infrastructure

Information System
Policy and
Management
Mission Needs
Security
Management

Personnel Issues
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Sub-Issues
Connectivity
Equipment
Throughput
Configuration Mgmt
Limited (MHS only)
Centralized
Management
Coordination
Medical Focus
Base Focus
Technology
Capability
Multi-level Security
COTS Focus
Management Policies
Legal focus (Due
Diligence)
Training (Limited)
Manpower

The development of this new architecture involves the Army, Navy, and Air
Force. The Air Force is involved in the architecture engineering and design, security
engineering, and WWW management. It is also involved in customer support on the
network and through Internet access. Lastly, it will be working with TIMPO on
implementation and training support. The Army's role includes network management
engineering support, network monitoring and performance, hardware maintenance and
sparing, and circuit deployment and management. The Navy is involved in capacity
planning and overall configuration management.

Summary
Exploitation of network system vulnerabilities has resulted in a change in how the
Department of Defense has chosen to defend its networks. The Air Force has
implemented a multi-part security plan, Barrier Reef, to provide adequate protection to all
of its network assets. The Air Force medical community has numerous network
connections that are not easily converted to operate behind the Barrier Reef protection.
Many of the systems the Air Force medical community operates are stove-piped, and
many others do not have any security features built in. As a result, the TIMPO was
directed to develop a secure, robust architecture to allow the MHS to securely interact
with the network systems of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Still, nothing found in the
research or in this traditional approach by TIMPO provides a clear understanding of the
issues involved in solving the Air Force medical community network problem.
Chapter III will discuss the method used to collect the necessary data to begin the
process of establishing a framework of issues that any potential solution to the Air Force
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medical community network problem should include. Then in Chapter IV, the collected
data will be analyzed and assessed to determine the primary factors that are needed to
build that framework. Chapter V will discuss the results and the framework of issues. It
will also include limitations of this research and recommendations for future research.
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III.

Methodology

Introduction
This research collected information to support a framework of issues relevant to
resolving the Air Force medical community's problem of maintaining its assorted
network connectivity while providing for security of its network. This chapter describes
the methodology used to conduct this research and discusses its exploratory nature.
Included in this chapter is a description of the population under study and justification for
the selection criteria of respondents from whom the data was gathered.

Research Method
The literature review developed a number of related topics of interest to this
study. Much has been written on risk assessment and risk mitigation. Beyond the
literature on the actions of TIMPO, little research on the Air Force medical community
network dilemma was found. For this reason, an exploratory study was conducted to
provide a framework of issues that any potential solution to the Air Force medical
community network problem should include.
The Air Force's major medical centers were selected as the subjects for
qualitative study. Qualitative research on organizations refers to research that involves a
small number of organizations whereas quantitative research typically requires a
substantially larger n for analysis (Cash, 1989). In a similar study, AFCA successfully
used case study methodology to assess the impacts of Barrier Reef at an operational site
(AFCA/GCIT, 1997). A case study was identified as a suitable approach for dealing with
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the exploratory investigation of management questions (Cooper and Emory, 1995). It is
recognized that the amount of published data is seldom more than a small fraction of the
existing knowledge in the field (Cooper and Emory, 1995). For that reason, it is
productive to seek the input from those experienced in the field of interest (Cooper and
Schindler, 1998). This case study used an experience questionnaire to help identify the
areas of interest surrounding this Air Force medical community issue. The experience
questionnaire is a useful tool for generating new hypotheses, models, or ideas requiring
in-depth knowledge in areas lacking quality secondary data (Cooper and Schindler,
1998).
During the literature review no reliable historical data was found relating to the
Air Force medical community's current network dilemma. A likely reason for this is that
direction for implementing network policy and procedures has been directed by a number
of separate organizations: Air Force SC (Communications and Information) and SG
(Surgeon General) directorates, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health
Affairs (OASD(HA)), public law, and so on. These independent directions were
provided on a case-by-case basis and typically involved systems that did not interact with
each other, so little if any coordination was necessary. However, much information was
identified relating to the general issues of network security and business partnering. To
collect the necessary information, questionnaire subjects from the population of interest
were selected.
The strategy for collecting this data was to pick a sample of the Air Force medical
community population that would provide information that represented the considerations
and concerns for the whole population. Collecting data from the Air Force's major
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medical centers seemed likely to provide the data necessary for this research. That
segment of the medical community tended to have a much higher degree of connectivity
than did the smaller medical facilities. These centers acted as the information hubs in the
medical community's infrastructure and tended to have larger network management
functions and a pool of resident expertise.
The idea of choosing the major medical centers was that if the research produced
significant findings with this segment of the population, then the research would likely
have applicability for rest of the population of interest. This was inferred based on
evidence found in research that if hypotheses can be supported using the selection of the
strictest case within a population, then the likelihood for applicability to similar or lesser
cases is improved (Cash, 1989). With these concepts in mind, this researcher examined a
single Air Force major medical center for background, then developed a questionnaire for
collecting data from all of the Air Force major medical centers.

Questionnaire Development
The Wright-Patterson Medical Center (WPMC) was used as the initial site for
collecting background data. The data collection at this stage consisted of an unstructured
questionnaire, documentation review and observation. These methods helped to define
and refine the areas of interest for the questionnaire. Wright-Patterson Medical Center
was involved in migrating its network systems to a position behind the base's network
security (Barrier Reef). Wright-Patterson Medical Center was working diligently to find
alternatives to its issue of maintaining connectivity with contracting and trading partners.
Much information was collected from WPMC and used in the development of the data
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collection instrument discussed shortly. The WPMC representative also confirmed the
locations of the Air Force's major medical centers and provided points of contact for each
of the facilities. The following complexes are identified as medical centers and are the
subjects of this study:
Wright-Patterson Medical Center
Scott Medical Center
Travis Medical Center
Andrews Medical Center
Keesler Medical Center
Wilford Hall Medical Wing
Yokota AB Medical Center
These facilities comprise all of the Air Force's major (regional or higher) medical
centers. As such, this study was performed as a census; here, census refers to data
collection from all possible instances of major medical centers. In exploratory research,
it is more important to pick sources that might provide insight than to look for a general
cross-sectional representation (Cooper and Emory, 1995). These major medical centers
are a clearly defined subset of the greater medical population. According to Cooper and
Emory (1995), discovery is more easily carried out if the researcher can analyze cases
that provide special insight. Due to the extensive medical services and much higher
volume of personnel, patients, and (importantly) network activity they support, this group
is identified as the strictest case of the population. Also the information systems experts
are expected to provide the special insight into the issues surrounding the Air Force
medical network dilemma.
With the findings from the WPMC background data and the literature review, a
questionnaire was built for collecting data on all of the seven major medical centers. A
combination of closed and open-ended questions was used for data collection. The
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closed questions were used to ensure that all of the respondents were operating from a
common understanding of the area of interest and to establish a general framing of the
open-ended questions that were to follow. Research indicates that using open-ended
questions in experience questionnaires is a good method for collecting data relating to
general ideas, "what" questions, and specific experiences (Cooper and Schindler, 1998).
For this research, the information surrounding the network security and connectivity
issues will be drawn from the open-ended questions.
Validity. This research is intended to apply to the population of Air Force
medical facilities. For this research, internal validity by means of content validity was
used. Content validity of the measuring instrument is the extent to which it adequately
covers the topic under study (Cooper and Emory). An accepted means for establishing
validity in exploratory research is judgement and can be determined by experts in the
field. (Churchill, 1983). This assessment occurred in the development and revision of the
questionnaire as described earlier and in the background investigation and study of the
Wright-Patterson Medical Center.
Reliability.

Reliability, which addresses whether an instrument produces

consistent and stable results, is a necessary contributor to validity. It is not, however,
solely sufficient in demonstrating that condition (Cooper and Emory, 1995). In their
research textbook, Cooper and Emory use the example of a bathroom scale to draw the
distinction:
If the bathroom scale measures weight correctly, (using concurrent
criterion such as a scale known to be accurate), then the scale is both
reliable and valid. If it consistently overweighs you by six pounds, then
the scale is reliable but not valid. If the scale measures erratically from
time to time, then it is not reliable and therefore cannot be valid.
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The reliability of this instrument is difficult to establish given the open-ended nature of
the questions and the exploratory nature of the research (Cooper and Schindler, 1998).
The intent of this research is not to confirm consistency of responses; but rather, it is to
gather as much information of relevance to the area of interest. Therefore, there is likely
to be significant variance in the responses and explanations by the respondents.
Questionnaire. A researcher-guided questionnaire was used to collect data for
this project. The questionnaire was divided into three sections (Demographics, Section A
specifically for medical representatives, and Section B specifically for base
communications support representatives). The questions in section B mirror those in
Section A with one exception. A series of questions surrounding the issue of medical
center dependence on outside agencies were asked only of the medical respondents since
that group is the only one with that area of expertise. Based on insight gained from
related literature and from data collected in the background study phase of this project,
the researcher developed the questionnaire listed in Appendix A.
Specific questions were developed to ascertain the underlying issues with respect
to cost, benefit, dependence, and risk. These constructs were developed from the
literature review in Chapter II. Many references to various aspects of network security
were addressed. These included a common theme of risk assessment. According to the
literature, network risk assessment involves identifying the information of value,
determining the existing vulnerabilities and threats that can take advantage of those
vulnerabilities, and assessing what actions can be taken to mitigate the risk. It also
included the need to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for the network security. For
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example, risk assessment would conclude that it is not rational to spend more money on
network security than the value of the asset. At some point the costs outweigh the
benefit. Additionally, the issue of dependence moderates the valuation of the networked
information/assets. Contracts, public laws, and other directives drive much of the Air
Force medical community connectivity. The community is finding itself very dependent
on the current connectivity arrangement because of unresolved issues of proprietary
information systems that result in a lack of interoperability. The lost flexibility of the
medical community to provide these connections through other means has complicated
its network security situation. The questionnaire is intended to flesh out the issues that
must be addressed for this medical community problem and will focus on the construct
areas listed above.
The structure of the questionnaire was developed to promote responsiveness on
the part of the representative providing data. Specific demographic questions were used
to compare the two respondent groups' experience levels. More important to the
development of the desired framework, open-ended questions were used to gather
information on various constructs identified in the literature review and in the
background research. These questions prompted the respondents for detailed and
explanatory answers to the construct areas.
To avoid misunderstanding and ambiguity in the questionnaire and any bias based
on a specific base's configuration, definitions for key concepts and issues of interest in
the questionnaire were provided immediately prior to the series of questions related to
those terms. Additionally, all of the questions were posed in "positive" form; that is, a
question about Barrier Reef issues would have been asked, "What issues impact Barrier
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Reef?" as opposed to asking "What are the issues that do not impact Barrier Reef." The
positive form supported clarity for both the respondents during the interview as well as
for the researcher during data analysis. All of the questionnaires were administered by a
single researcher to promote consistency in the data collection process. The final
questionnaire represented refinement from the culmination of numerous iterations based
on input of faculty and local experts in network security.
Pretesting. The draft of the questionnaire was critically reviewed and pretested
prior to administration to the respondents. Pretesting was accomplished in two distinct
phases. Members of the Air Force Institute of Technology faculty reviewed the
questionnaire for completeness and appropriateness. After sufficient revision and followup review, the questionnaire was deemed to sufficiently address the research and
investigative questions. As a final step in the pretesting cycle, feedback was solicited
from two colleagues. Both have extensive background in networks and network
management. These two reviewers recommended minor word changes and more specific
definitions to lessen the ambiguity of the questions in the instrument. Final modification
reflected these recommendations, and then the updated instrument was put forth for final
approval. The approval was granted and the scheduling of times to administer the
questionnaire began.

Subjects
This researcher chose to conduct telephone interviews with specific points of
contact representing each regional medical center's and each support base's
network/computer organization. Obtaining information from both the major medical
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centers and their support base organizations helped to ensure that no topic of interest was
overlooked. To minimize the variability between respondents, criteria were established
for whom was allowed to represent an organization in this research effort. To promote
information gathering from the most knowledgeable of sources at each location, contact
was made with the person in charge of each organization's networked information
resources. This person tended to hold the position of branch chief, flight commander, or
chief information officer for the organization.
Each manager was informed of the nature of the research and asked to provide the
name and phone number of the most qualified person in their organization to answers
questions within the defined area of interest. To ensure a representative had sufficient
experience in networks as well as the represented organization, each was required to have
at least one year of direct experience in management of network systems and personnel.
Additionally, each needed to be currently in that type of position and to have held it for at
least six months. This current familiarity with the represented organization's system
configuration and management issues was considered essential. All of the information
managers readily consented to participate and identified qualified respondents to
participate in the data collection effort.
For this research, an n = 7 was used for the medical respondent group, one
representative from all seven major medical center locations. For the support base
respondents, an n = 6 was used. This reduction of one data point accounts for the
autonomy of Wilford Hall Medical Center. Wilford Hall Medical Center operates and
maintains its own networks due to its size and dislocation from its support base, Lackland
Air Force Base.
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The questionnaire respondents had a common frame of reference of network
security. Each had direct experience dealing with the day-to-day management and
operation of networked systems. The minimum criteria defined for the respondents was
selected to ensure each had this experience and therefore the ability to discern specific
issues relevant to the medical community's dilemma for maintaining network
connectivity while meeting its network security requirements. The questioning of both
the base support and medical network experts provided the opportunity to develop a
thorough framework of the dilemma's issues.

Approach
During the evolution of the questionnaire, the researcher began contacting the
seven locations hosting major Air Force medical centers to identify appropriate personnel
to participate in the data collection effort. The merits of each participant were based on
strict selection criteria. Each representative had to be in a position directly responsible
for the operation, maintenance, and/or management ofthat installation's networks
(medical or support base). The representative had to be recommended by the person in
charge ofthat organization's network or information management to ensure a general
level of experience and sufficient familiarity with network issues. Each representative
was required to have at least 12 months of networking experience with at least 6 months
at the location being represented.
The rationale for collecting data using a telephone questionnaire was to obtain the
highest response rate possible in support of a census and to promote a more thorough
response. Any level of non-response in this situation given the small sample size could
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have had significant effect. Additionally, by personally conducting each questionnaire,
the researcher was able to elicit a more detailed response to the questions. Without this
added detail, the significance of this research effort would be considerably lessened. The
estimated time required to administer each questionnaire was 45 minutes. The actual
range was approximately 30-65 minutes and depended primarily on the time the
respondents spent providing details. To assess the effectiveness of the series of
questions, the questionnaire was pretested before administration to the representatives of
the Air Force major medical centers and their support bases.
A total of 13 representatives were questioned in the data collection process,
thereby obtaining the desired census. Each of the intended representatives was contacted
by phone to discuss the research focus of this thesis and to schedule a convenient time to
administer the questionnaire. Research indicated that it was important to disclose to each
intended respondent the motivation for the data collection and specifically why each
respondent was selected (Cooper and Emory, 1995). At the initial contact, commitment
was obtained from 10 representatives; two representatives were not available for contact
and the last refused to participate in the data collection effort. Later, this researcher
discovered that the refusal of the last representative was based on recent attacks and
infiltration ofthat organization's networks. The representative thought that the timing of
the request for information was more than circumstantial. In the end, the respondent
agreed to participate after receiving clarification from his information manager.
In conducting the telephone questionnaire, special attention was paid to inform
the respondents of their rights during the questioning. They were informed that they had
the option to answer all, any, or none of the question posed to them. They were also told
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that they reserved the right to terminate the session at their discretion. They were also
informed that the responses provided during the session would not be attributed to them
or to their organizations. The demographics data collected and the specific questionnaire
responses would only be used as pooled data for general analysis. With this
understanding, all of the respondents were willing to proceed with the questions.

Summary
A census was conducted of the medical and support base organizations of the Air
Force major medical centers. Experts from each organization were selected to answer a
questionnaire to help build a framework of issues for dealing with a medical community
problem. Again, the Air Force medical community's dilemma is trying to maintain
network connectivity to all of its government and commercial partners while providing
mandated protection of its network systems. The major medical centers were selected as
the source for the experience data given the higher complexity of their network
connectivity. Specific respondents were selected based on recommendations from the
organizations' chief information manager (or equivalent) based on criteria to ensure
sufficient expertise. An open-ended questionnaire was developed to promote respondent
elaboration to the various questioned posed to respondent.
Chapter IV discusses the completed model and how the primary factors were
derived. Chapter V will then provide a discussion of the results of this research and
identify areas for future research.
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IV.

Analysis of Questionnaire Responses

Overview
The data collected from the base network personnel supporting these major
medical centers is displayed in this chapter in the form of an issue framework. In
addition to reviewing the demographic information for appropriateness of the responding
groups, this chapter discusses the processes used to determine the issues that make up the
framework from which to better address the medical community's network problem, and
then explains the relevance of each developed issue.

Demographics
The demographic data were reviewed for two purposes. First, the data was
reviewed to ensure that the respondents all met the minimum criteria established at the
onset of data collection. The criteria were set to provide a measure of assurance that each
of the respondents had sufficient familiarity with networks in general and their current
organization's networks in specific. Each of the respondents met all of the initial criteria.
Significant differences were noted between the two groups with respect to the average
time each respondent has been in the current networks position as well as to how many
other organizations the respondent has worked with. These differences have relevance
with the continuity issue brought up by respondents and will be discussed in the
following section. The second reason for examining the demographics was to determine
if the respondents were the proper group to provide the information desired to support
this research endeavor. Based on the scope and consistency of the responses, the
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researcher was confident that the respondents were indeed the proper response group for
this exploration.

Collection of Responses
Method of Analysis. All of the responses gathered from the telephone interview
were transcribed into a spreadsheet (Appendix A). The transcription was done in note
form and was not produced as a full reproduction of the respondents' comments. If a
question was not asked of a particular respondent (i.e. medical specific questions were
not posed to support base respondents), the block was marked N/A. There were times
where the respondent did not provide a salient response to a question. The person
conducting the interview determined that all comments related to this research were
important. If in the course of asking a question, the respondent had touched on an area of
his/her interest, the interviewer waited for a moment to redirect the respondent. This was
done to allow the respondent freedom to convey issues and still control the direction of
the conversation. In some cases, respondents wished to elaborate in some areas and not
in others. The blocks with no response given are blank.
The findings were evaluated to determine trends between the medical and base
respondents. The only area of note involved the question on the recommended choice of
network security for the medical networks. The majority of support base respondents felt
that Barrier Reef was adequate for the task. One respondent commented, "Barrier Reef
should be able to work. It'll cost to work out all of the configuration issues, but we can
do it." The typical response from the medical respondent stressed that Barrier Reef is not
working. "Isolating the medical networks enables them to conduct business at the level
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to provide needed service to physicians etc." (e.g. Physicians would have the ability to
have full network access from home). Also healthcare is a regional activity, not base
specific." Overall, respondents agreed that this isolation approach would be much more
costly; but for the medical respondents, it is a necessary cost.
Unexpected Results. The major finding outside the expected response areas was
the overwhelming opinion that many of the problems the medical community is facing
occurred because there is no one organization with sole authority to implement network
changes. Based on the time most of the respondents spent on this one area, this appears
to be one of the critical areas that is lacking. Some of the comments follow. "The
biggest problem is that the systems aren't deployed by the Air Force. Most are directed
from beyond the Air Force's control and have different requirements. HA and SG are not
working with SC." Also, "We really need a unified IT Plan. There is a big disconnect
between the SG [Hospital] and SC [Base Computer and Communication] communities."
General Factors. In all, seven general factors were identified from the comments
of the questionnaire respondents. The comments of the respondents were grouped based
on subject area of the response. As an example of respondent comments, one expert
specifically advocated the isolation of Air Force medical networks saying, "Isolation of
the nets provides closer control and allows for configuration for a smaller number of
users. This allows for better tailoring to mission needs." The subjects vary widely and
address issues from the obvious architecture and equipment needs to the less often
addressed issues of Social Engineering and Dependence. Here, Social Engineering refers
to the manipulation of people to fraudulently obtain access to information that those
people would not otherwise provide (Denning, 1999). Dependence refers not only to the
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Air Force medical community's dependence on the their network connectivity but also to
the organizations that it is partnered with. The following list identifies the issues that
developed from the respondents' answers to the questionnaire:
Infrastructure
Information System Policy and Management *
Mission Needs
Security Management
Social Engineering
Personnel Issues
Dependence
* Denotes a post-hoc finding

Developed Issues for the Framework
The relevant issues for the medical community's network problem were identified
using an experience questionnaire. Questions focusing on the constructs of risk,
cost/benefit analysis, and dependence were used to promote the solicitation of ideas and
issues from the respondents. The answers provided by each respondent were evaluated
and then consolidated into various response groupings. These groupings were established
based on how well the data seemed to describe or otherwise relate to the same issue.
These groupings were examined for overlap and groups were redefined to clearly
distinguish between issues. After further assessment, the final groupings were identified
as individual issues for consideration.
Infrastructure. All 13 respondents discussed some issue with infrastructure costs.
Within this issue are several related topics. Long-haul connectivity costs were identified
as an area of significant area of impact given the numerous connections operated by the
medical community. The costs will vary according to the final solution. Respondents
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stated that isolating the medical networks will allow the medical community to bundle
some of its network connections but will result in significant recurring costs for dedicated
and general leased lines. The support bases currently pay for much of this cost. The
Barrier Reef solution requires the medical connections to run through the base lines. The
rehoming of all these medical connections is not only time consuming and manpower
intensive, it may require increasing of the size of each base's pipe. The added traffic
through the Barrier Reef entry point is analogous to adding traffic on a highway. The
road may have to widen to alleviate congestion. Another area of interest dealt with the
equipment required. While the effect of rehoming the services in Barrier Reef is not
believed to require significant equipment costs, establishing an isolated network for the
medical community requires a substantial equipment investment. The respondents all
reported that the medical community would be required to duplicate all of the network
architecture elements (routers, servers, etc.) in addition to the network security equipment
necessary for it to continue network operations and services.
Information System Policy and Management. One of the most interesting
outcomes of the questionnaire involved the issue of information policy and management.
Without any questions directing attention to the subject, 8 of the 13 respondents
identified the discontinuity of policy and lack of a central management for networked
activities as an important issue to consider. Even support base respondents were
consistent in identifying this as a problem. The Air Force and the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affaire (OASD(HA)) have been at odds in developing
and mandating network architectures. Unfortunately, these mandates are often worked
within the policy directorate of the owning community with no outside coordination.
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Respondents report that it is not unusual to have a system installation team show up at the
base with no forewarning. The base and the medical facility are put in a position to work
out arrangements on the spot and then worry over who will manage, operate, and
maintain the system. On rare occasions, the installation team has been directed to stay on
for some period to train system administrators on how to operate this new system.
Until recently, as described in Chapter II, the OASD(HA) had the authority to
direct connections and network structure for the medical group with little say from the
Air Force communications and information community which was tasked to support it.
Recent directives have changed this way of doing business, but the two communities are
still working out how to implement their designs for security and connectivity. The
concern is still the lack of balance in the relationship between the medical community
and the support base activities. The respondents feel that either some single authority
should be in charge of all DoD networks or that clear lines of responsibility and authority
be in place, possibly contractually, to support the relationship between the SG and SC
communities. At the time of this research, TIMPO is in meetings with the Air Force
Communications Agency (AFCA) to work on these arrangements.
Mission Needs. Along with the issue of information policy and management, a
related issue developed. The respondents all commented (13 of 13) on the fact that the
business of the medical community was somehow different from the support base
community. First, the medical community networks are intended to support the provision
of medical care to not only the active duty members in wartime but also to the member,
member's dependents, and retirees in peacetime. The focus for the Air Force networks at
large is to support the warfighter and leadership in peace and in war. In its peacetime
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operations, the medical community is more similar to a civilian HMO than it is to the
other support services of the military. There is an impression from the respondents that
security is more of a concern for the medical community than it has been in the past.
However, differences still exist; the support bases are more concerned about security
while the medical community is more concerned about generally supporting medical
services. One medical respondent commented, "[We] have multiple access points. [Our]
focus is on the day-to-day medical needs and not on security." A similar response from a
support base respondent was "... their focus is customer service and access to
information for many groups; they have a decreased focus in security." When asked
about the usefulness of Barrier Reef in protecting the support base networks, almost all of
the respondents in both groups stated that Barrier Reef was sufficient for the bases'
needs. When the same question was asked about Barrier Reef protecting the medical
community networks, less than half of all respondents stated that Barrier Reef could
provide the needed security. Respondents clearly felt that Barrier Reef will not provide
the Air Force medical community the same protection that it does to the operational Air
Force. The Tri-service Infrastructure Management Program Office (TIMPO) has been
tasked with addressing difference in mission needs for all of the DoD services and has
recognized that the security measures of each service cannot support the medical
networks current connectivity.
Security Management. This refers to the various activities involved in
minimizing the vulnerabilities of networked systems and information. A natural outcome
of these actions is the overall reduction of risk. All of the respondents felt that the stateof-the-art in network security (encryption, advanced routing and filtering equipment,
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system monitoring techniques and tools, etc.) has the potential to sufficiently secure all of
the Air Force medical networks. Similarly, they all agree that the policy and political
situation will prevent that from happening. A typical response was "The technology is
there and it will work if politics and people use it to it's potential."
Social Engineering. A few (4 of 13) of the respondents identified people as the
weak link in network security. One example of social engineering found in research is
where an adversary tries to gain access to a network system by lying about his or her
identity in an attempt to either gain direct access or to get information that will allow
access (Caldwell, 1990). Despite the low number identifying this issue, it still may be
significant when developing potential solutions. This issue is not addressed in the Air
Force's Barrier Reef concept nor is it currently addressed by TIMPO. For example,
Barrier Reef uses active controls to limit the use of weak passwords, but it does not deal
with social engineering. The only actions the respondents see in use to minimize the
impact of social engineering is through the posting of policy letters and that is not
sufficient action. One respondent commented that "the technological capability to secure
the networks is there. However, there is minimal attention paid to addressing human
factors and social engineering." As Air Force network systems are made more
impenetrable to unauthorized users, it is likely that an adversary will turn to other weak
points. Research indicates that one of these areas is social engineering (Denning, 1999).
Personnel Issues. All 13 of the respondents identified concerns with manpower
and the training of manpower. When measured against all of the other issues, 11 of 13
respondents stated that training and training related issues were the most important longterm concern. Nearly all stated that they would be hard pressed to support the increase in
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training because of severely limited budgets. The medical community has a related
problem in that it has no military-run schoolhouse to educate its members. The only
exception came from one respondent who stated, "We are unique. Fortunately we have
access to the enlisted communications technical training school since it's located here."
To compensate, the Air Force medical community has taken to hiring the necessary
expertise via contractors and federal civil service employees (Young, 1999).
Coupled with the training concern was another about overall continuity. This
concern is particularly significant for military organizations. Historically, the military
member tends to be reassigned more often than contractors and civil service employees.
The support base respondents in this study were all active duty, and the medical
respondents in this data collection were a mix of contractors, federal civil service, and
active duty members. Not surprisingly then, the military members have been in their
current positions less time and have worked more networking jobs per unit time than their
medical respondent counterparts. Worthy of note is the fact that training was considered
the highest long-term concern for both groups. In their words, "Training is biggest; no
short cuts available in the Air Force; we train them and they leave for commercial
sector." Another comment was, "Basically, we don't see more people coming down the
pipe. More people and more training are required." Hiring expertise by medical
respondents and providing schoolhouse training by support base respondents were not
seen as sufficient answers to this problem.
Dependence. Because of outsourcing, networks are becoming more and more
dependent on outside management. Respondents noted that "For Tri-care to work, it
must have full access to provider information" and that "Overall the dependence on them
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is increasing." When activities are outsourced, the manpower billets based on that
activity go away (Young, 1999). For the medical community, the trend is for downwarddirected programs to be funded at the top level and contracted out; the medical facilities
just receive the contracted system (Young, 1999). Respondents additionally commented
that "Existing systems are proprietary." This leaves the medical centers with fairly longterm (five-year) contracts and limited capability to easily change systems. One
respondent commented that "the Air Force medical community is being taken advantage
of. These long-term contracts limit its ability to pursue the benefits of free enterprise and
non-proprietary systems." If the decision is made to bring these functions in-house, most
agree that "it would take years and a lot of money to recreate what's out there right now."
Without the ability to easily standardize systems and eliminate stove-pipe configurations,
perhaps the next best option is to not attempt to use the TIMPO proposal and leave the
current systems as is and take action to secure the infrastructure (TIMPO, 1999).

Proposed Framework of Issues
Table 3 depicts the framework of issues that respondents identified as having
relevance to the current Air Force medical network problem. The mission needs issue
appears to be a critical issue as it defines the comparison between the line and medical
communities. Table 4 represents the developed issues in a side-by side comparison with
the current TIMPO direction to provide a robust and secure medical network architecture.
The TIMPO arrangement is directly in line with the Generally Accepted System Security
Principles and has more of an architectural focus. This is appropriate since identification
of a new architecture was TIMPO's stated focus.
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Table 3. Respondent Issues
Major Issues
Infrastructure

Information System Policy and
Management
Mission Needs
Security Management
Social Engineering
Personnel Issues

Dependence

Sub-Issues
Connectivity
Equipment
Throughput
Centralized Management
Coordination
Medical Focus
Base Focus
Technology Capability
Political Limitations
People as the Weak Link
Continuity of Personnel
Training
Manpower
Service/Vendor Dependence
Impact of Contracts

Table 4. Comparison of Respondent Issues to TEMPO Issues
Respondent Issues
Sub-Issues
Major Issues
Connectivity
Infrastructure
Equipment
Throughput
Configuration Mgmt
Centralized
Information System
Management
Policy and
Management
Coordination
Medical Focus
Mission Needs
Base Focus
Technology
Security
Capability
Management
Political/Management
Decisions

TIMPO Issues
Sub-Issues
Major Issues
Connectivity
Infrastructure
Equipment
Throughput
Configuration Mgmt
Limited (MHS only)
Information System
Centralized
Policy and
Management
Management
Coordination
Medical Focus
Mission Needs
Base Focus
Technology
Security
Capability
Management
Multi-level Security
COTS Focus
Management Policies
Legal focus (Due
Diligence)

Social Engineering
Personnel Issues

Dependence

People as Weak Link
Continuity
Training
Manpower
Ability to do without
Impact of Contracts
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Personnel Issues
Training (Limited)
Manpower

Summary
The Air Force medical network issues framework identifies seven major areas
that are important to address in the consideration of solutions to the Air Force medical
community's dilemma in providing mandated network connectivity while protecting its
networks. In addition, the demographic information supported the appropriateness of the
responding groups for developing the issues framework. They all met the criteria
indicating sufficient familiarity with general network issues and specific understanding of
the issues in dealing with the Air Force major medical centers. The reason this group
was specifically selected was addressed in Chapter III. This chapter discussed the
process by which related areas of interest were put together into larger issues. These
issues were explained to support their importance in solving the Air Force medical
community's on-going network problem. Chapter V will discuss the implications of
these findings and will provide recommendation based on the developed network issues
framework.
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V.

Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion

Review of the Dilemma
The Air Force has instituted Barrier Reef as the series of security measures to
protect its networks. The Air Force medical community operates mandated network
connectivity that is not compatible with Barrier Reef. This incompatibility results from
various network protocols and configurations used in the more than 100 military health
system (MHS) automated information systems (AISs). To overcome this problem, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (OASD(HA)) directed the
Tri-Service Management Program Office (TIMPO) to develop a robust, secure, standards
based architecture that would protect all military medical systems and allow the systems
to continue with existing connectivity. The plan proposed by TIMPO is based on issues
developed in the generally accepted system security principles (GASSP) and on current
network security technology. The plan is based on a current understanding of the
networking issues and no background investigation into the completeness of those issues
was conducted.

The Purpose of the Research
Without investigating the completeness of the issues surrounding the Air Force
medical network dilemma, there is a potential for oversight of one or more important
factors. The purpose of the research was to identify issues that should be considered in
any potential solution to the Air Force's medical network dilemma. The nature of the
research effort was exploratory. Following established research guidelines for an
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exploratory study, an open-ended experience questionnaire was used to gather data from
network experts representing each of the Air Force major medical centers and each
corresponding support base. The findings from the exploratory study were grouped by
subject area and compared to the issues covered by the TIMPO plan. These issues were
then combined into a framework that is discussed below.

Overview of the Framework
The framework was developed to provide a more complete identification of the
issues that require consideration as the Air Force medical community attempts to solve
how it will protect its networked systems and still maintain its required connectivity. It is
not enough to solve a problem based on the architectural needs of the system. Security
issues should also be addressed along with a concerted forethought on how the actions
will affect all of the users of the affected network. The developed framework points out
some of the areas that may get overlooked. By paying attention to the less obvious issues
from the start, they will be less likely to turn into obvious problems in the end. When
combined, the issues identified by the respondent network field experts and TIMPO
encapsulate the issues of interest. Table 5 provides a view of this consolidated
framework of issues. Items not addressed in the TIMPO plan are underlined.
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Table 5. Proposed Framework of Network Issues
Sub-Issues
Connectivity
Equipment
Throughput
Configuration Mgmt
Centralized
Management
Coordination
Medical Focus
Base Focus
Technology
Capability
Multi-level Security
COTS Focus
Political/Management
Decisions
Legal focus (Due
Diligence)
People as Weak Link
Continuity
Training
Manpower
Ability to do without
Impact of Contracts

Major Issues
Infrastructure

Information System
Policy and
Management
Mission Needs
Security
Management

Social Engineering
Personnel Issues

Dependence

Comparison of the Network Issues Framework and the TIMPO Plan
The TIMPO plan is a major step forward in addressing the security woes of the
military health system (MHS) in general. The TIMPO is chartered to design, provision,
and deploy a standards based, common infrastructure throughout the MHS. The intent is
to migrate the architecture to one that is tailored to the specific connectivity and security
needs of the MHS. The plan TIMPO proposes is in line with the GASSP and appears to
be a viable approach for dealing with the MHS requirements to operate in the Tri-Service
environment. The TIMPO plan already addresses many (13 of 19) of the issues identified
in this research. The plan clearly addresses the issues of Infrastructure, Mission Needs,
and Security Management. Part of the issue of dependence is effectively neutralized
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from the standpoint of securing the system and ensuring adherence to standards for future
systems. Additionally, TIMPO has been established as the central management element
to provide MHS to all the Services. This does not resolve the disconnect between the
OASD(HA) and the Air Force SC community. TIMPO is an office under OASD(HA)
and is working medical network issues; however, TIMPO does not direct or otherwise
control Air Force SC actions. Therefore, the issue of centralized management has not
changed. Hopefully, a tighter coupling will develop between TIMPO and the Air Force
SC community. Evidence of this closer working relationship is taking shape as
representatives of AFC A and TIMPO are in meetings to ensure that the strategies of both
organizations are considered as TIMPO moves forward.
The TIMPO plan also encompasses some personnel issues. Medical community
manpower requirements were considered and some training standards have been
identified for the new architecture. The issue of personnel continuity is not addressed
and may be outside the plan's scope. The same may be true for the dependence issue of
contract length. These two issues seem to focus more on implementation of new systems,
whereas the TIMPO plan is an architectural change primarily in support of existing
systems. The one area where more attention would be of significant benefit is in social
engineering. This is an area of security that the research respondents said is underemphasized.

Implications for Practitioners and Researchers
By combining the two points of view, a more complete framework is provided
that better represent the issues that should be considered for any potential solution to the
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Air Force medical community's network problem. The implication for practitioners is to
use the issues framework. This framework identifies major issues and their specific
elements that should be considered. By giving attention to all of the issues, there is a
better opportunity for successful implementation. For researchers, this study provides an
opportunity to better identify the issues related to network security.

Limitations of the Research
Key limitations of this research include the potential for bias and the defined
population of interest. Specifically, the literature review describing the existing network
security situation and the classification of the various elements and issues as relevant are
potentially biased. While much of the findings in the literature were from independent
organizations (i.e. the General Accounting Office), the remainder was from a variety of
published sources that may have hidden biases. To minimize this impact in this research,
unsubstantiated views were not considered. Further, the data collected from
questionnaire respondents is subject to their biases and to any ambiguity of the data
collection process. The respondents gave information based on their familiarity with
network systems and issues; their responses are limited by these biases.
Finally, the limited scope of the research in turn limited the breadth of the
conclusions. This exploration was conducted on the Air Force's major medical centers
with the intent to apply throughout the Air Force medical community. Any potential
external application (such as for the Army or Navy's major medical centers) was
referenced as an area for future research and not addressed as a conclusion.
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Recommendations
The research findings indicated that two types of recommendations appear
necessary. The first involved recommendations for action by the Air Force and the Air
Force Medical Service. The second group of recommendations involved academic
interests; these were presented as areas for future research and are areas this research
effort would have include given sufficient opportunity.
Recommendations for Research. In addition to the recommendations for action
by practitioners, many opportunities to expand and refine this research were identified.
With respect to this research effort, repetition of this research is needed to confirm the
identification of the seven-issue framework that should be used when assessing network
solutions for the Air Force medical networks. Additionally, there is potential value in
expanding this research effort to include an evaluation of all the Air Force medical
facilities. Further inclusion of DoD medical facilities would also be of value given the
attempts of TIMPO to develop a Tri-Service solution. Another important area for future
research is a closer analysis of the framework. This should be done in direct comparison
to GASSP and the TIMPO plan. Potentially, the issues developed in this research could
be included as part of the GASSP.

Conclusion
The framework developed in this research effort is proposed as a more complete
set of issues that have bearing when considering a potential solution to the Air Force's
medical network dilemma. It is an important step toward a better understanding of the
impact of various network issues. The new issues identified by network experts
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representing each of the Air Force's major medical centers and their corresponding base
network organizations should be considered in addition to those typically addressed in
medical network solutions. Social engineering, dependence of the medical establishment
on outside organizations, and contract length should also be considered. Additionally,
the lack of an overarching controlling authority for DoD networks remains a concern.
This last issue is seen by most of the respondents in this study as a major problem in
promoting a unified IT plan. Implications for practitioners are significant and provide
support for evolve how network security decisions are made. By understanding the
network security nuances and the issues involved for effective, efficient decision making,
mistakes could be avoided that limit the benefit, increase costs, or risk mitigation.
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Appendix A: Data Collection Tables
3. Services provided by networked
affiliates

A
MX on software; Data
interpretation; EDI for medical
supply ordering; Claims/
Appointments for Tri-care (Allied

B
N/A

C
Central Appts; "SIERRA" is not
stand alone. General supplier
and Pharacy stuff provided over
internet

HpaltM

4. Comparison between major med
centers and the rest

Quite varied, but same general
services

N/A

Everything pn the line side (base) N/A
is equally outsourced, somewhat
the same for med.
8. How able is the AF med able to do Health care is the primary mission N/A
-still can do this even without the
without the services provided by
other services
affiliates
10. How able is the AF med able to Existing systems are proprietary- N/A
perform affiliate services in-house would take years and $$$ to
recreate what's out there right
6. What drives the AF med
dependence on affiliates

Med centers are unique; much
higher volume, and overflow of
patients from other locations.
Also the number and variety of
services provided is much
greater.
reliance on partners for
appointment scheduling

nnw

We're stuck with Some systems
12. How able is AF med to obtain
affiliate services from other sources because of the proprietary issue.
Others are more onen.
Contracts are typically 5 years
14. How long-term are AF med
with series of 5 1-year options.
relationships with its affiliates

N/A

16. How able is the AF med to
change which affiliates it does
business with
18. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to BR

Personnel can adapt but current
contracts limit our ability to
chanae.
Have to pay for multiple lines.

N/A

20. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to I BR

Might have hubs, etc. outside our
control. Accessibility restricts
access to those who need the

N/A

Some mandates by DoD; can still
change, just takes longer

rtata

22. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of BR to I BR

the human component is still an
issue for maintaining info integrity

24./69. What's the most beneficiial
aspect of net security

reliability
People want to know "when"
theycan get the data; they want it

26./71. Cost areas: impact of
migration of No BR to BR

Support base picks up the burden DMZ of Barrier Reef;
servers moved out of
DMZ - duDlicates
Big initial equipment
costs

This is what we're trying to
protect

now!

28773. Cost areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to I BR

30775. Cost areas: Impact of
migration of BR to I BR

due to movement of responsibility same as 28
of Comm SQ to the maintainers
and operators of the i BR
netwnrk

32./77. Added Cost areas: Impact of Long haul might be affected by
fee for service. Liability is
migration of No BR to BR
affected because of increased
protection of info. Reduces the
likihnnrt nf a HIPA uinlatinn
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additional mngt.

duplication of effort and
equipment

duplication of effort and
equipment

D

E
EDI for nutritional medicine (tracking chowhall
N/A
supplies), for pharmacy supplies and refill; and fo
general med supplies

3. Services provided by networked
affiliates

N/A

4. Comparison between major med
centers and the rest

N/A

more technically advanced. More robust system
(had money to throw at it). Dramatically higher
volume of traffic.

6. What drives the AF med
dependence on affiliates

N/A

For Tri-care to work, must have full access to
N/A
provider information. Overall the dependence is
increasinn
Not much of the med community is directly tied to N/A
the services, but all would feel the impact

8. How able is the AF med able to do N/A
without the services provided by
affiliates
10. How able is the AF med able to N/A
perform affiliate services in-house

N/A

16. How able is the AF med to
change which affiliates it does
business with
18. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to BR

N/A

20. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to I BR

N/A

N/A

12. How able is AF med to obtain
N/A
affiliate services from other sources
14. How long-term are AF med
relationships with its affiliates

F

N/A

To a point, the AF med is being taken advantage' N/A
of.. .lonterm contracts limit the community to see
the benefits of free enerprise and non-proprietary
svstems
N/A

Don't see how IBR is beneficial all the added
costs with little to show. Just need to pay more
for a bigger pipe.

22. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of BR to I BR
24769. What's the most beneficiial
aspect of net security

Nature of what we do high reliance on pure info

26./71. Cost areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to BR
28./73. Cost areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to I BR

Unique at this base: have access to the 3CO etc. Hospital has same net;
technical training since it's located on station.
firewalls managed by AFNCC
Bases are funded for the
long-haul stuff

Multiple firewall, etc.; cost is
currently absorbed by base;
would have to shared out by all

30./75. Cost areas: Impact of
migration of BR to I BR

duplication of all the support base equipment is
very expensive

32777. Added Cost areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to BR

contract issues will require more attention.
Secure socket links reduces their liability
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same issues as before but
some spt equip would be no
change

3. Services provided by networked
affiliates

4. Comparison between major med
centers and the rest

H

G
Appointment Scheduling

N/A

Much bigger. More problems working
integration of more services and
connectivity requirements

N/A

I
MedLOg (supply procurement system;
CHCS services

Bigger has better high-tech initiatives.
Smaller facilities usually have same
services the are directed (regionally
managed) by the major medical
ce'nters.; they have much less volume.
Often, the O&M $$ goes toward med
treatment first, support second.

6. What drives the AF med
dependence on affiliates

N/A

8. How able is the AF med able to do
without the services provided by

N/A

10. How able is the AF med able to
perform affiliate services In-house

N/A

Cost prohibitive. Many must contract
out to provided needed expertise.

12. How able is AF med to obtain
affiliate services from other sources

N/A

Very Low due to proprietary issues

14. How long-term are AF med
relationships with its affiliates

N/A

DoD and AF contracts are not set up
for short term

16. How able is the AF med to
change which affiliates it does

N/A

Accessibility still hasauthentication
requirements so it's still somewhat
restricted

18. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to BR
20. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to I BR

22. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of BR to I BR
24-/69. Whafs the most beneficiial
aspect of net security
26./71. Cost areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to BR

slightly higher; typically not starting
from ground zero.

28./73. Cost areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to I BR

More people to work/manage the
different systems are required.

30./75. Cost areas: Impact of
migration of BR to I BR

Basically , we dont see more people
coming down the pipe. More people
and more training is required for

Even though not challenged the BR
sacrifices speed for info integrity

Infrastructure is in place to provide
availability

Adding proxies, firewall, extra SMTP
relays, and certification to operate increase
Added equip and systems

Suport Base gets stuck with the equip
costs. Same with personnel issues

fine tuning to various customers will
increase prices

Individual purchases of support equip
(server farms, etc.) is costly. No
sharing of equipment
with them meeting connectivity
standards the comtractors will have to
raise costs

32-/77. Added Cost areas: Impact of More work, more costs
migration of No BR to BR
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J
3. Services provided by networked
affiliates

N/A

4. Comparison between major med
centers and the rest

N/A

6. What drives the AF med
dependence on affiliates

N/A

K

Much biger pipes and equipment
requirements to handle the larger volume of
traffic

L
EDI for drug/generta med supplies

Med centers have much bigger volume of
N/A
network traffic. Budgets allow for tral projects
to support unique services

Much of services is outsourced; short supply
of options

8. How able is the AF med able to do N/A
without the services provided by
affiliates
10. How able is the AF med able to N/A
perform affiliate services in-house

M
N/A

N/A

N/A

not trained/educated for that

N/A

12. How able is AF med to obtain
N/A
affiliate services from other sources

budgetary and personnel restrictions limit the N/A
options

14. How long-term are AF med
relationships with Its affiliates

N/A

Tightly bound by DoD contracts

N/A

16. How able is the AF med to
change which affiliates it does
business with
18. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to BR

N/A

limited by length of contracts

N/A

20. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to I BR

22. Benefit areas: Impact of
migration of SR to I BR

Multiple D1SN POPs is costly

24769. What's the most beneficiial
aspect of net security

Information Resource Protection is the
primary focus; everything else falls out by

That's what it is intended to support

wouldn't mind getting slower
info as long as it is reliable

26./71. Cost areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to BR
28.Z73. Cost areas: impact of
migration of No BR to I BR

duplication of hw & sw

all the different systems to
take care of, etc.

30./75. Cost areas: Impact of
migration of BR to I BR

22.177. Added Cost areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to BR

Closing redundant circuits helps long-haul
Minimal increase in QAE;
costs. Also HIPA may lessen the liability issue Yokota forces them to give
for contractors
better protection
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B

A
34./79. Added Cost areas: Impact of (Same)
migration of No BR to 1 BR
36./81. Added Cost areas: Impact of
miaration of BR to I BR
38783. How capable is SOTA in Net Technology exists, just not
allowed to fully implement
Sec for AF med nets

C
much more management
required on contracts

duplication

85. How capable is SOTA in Net Sec same as 83
for AF nets
Not every hacker wants access to
40./87. Attacker interest in
med/other data unless they're
networked data
after money making opportunities.

42789. Vulnerability of netorked data There are alwayss vulnerabilities Emphasis is better on
mission; day to day
since we make mistakes and
become complacent
compromises on policy
44791. Attacker ability to gain user
access

Depends on the purpose of the
hacker.

46793. How likely will attackers be
dissuaded from attacking based on
net sec
48795. User Trust Ordering of net
sec options

Some will always try, even if just
for the challenge.
Isolation of the net provides
closer control and allows
configuration for a smaller # of
users; better tailoring to misison

a lot of the information is
vulnerable. People don't use
proper safeguards.
We can limit their direct access
but too many other options exist
tor them to aain access.

Amount of confidence for BR has name recognition and
isolated mngt. Vs. central has been touted as the way to
go. People will believe that.
mngt.

noprlQ

50797799. How does net sec config.
Reflect trust of users
Average. Have some protective
527101. How trust-worthy are AF
measures
med nets

they need to deal with
DoD, commercial,
causes management/
sprairitvnrnhlpms

Not bad. We have a lot of
external connectivity but it's
managed well.

547103 How trust-worthy are the AF Thought of as the weak link, the
finger has been pointed at our
med nets perceived
other connectivity
567105. What net sec config is best Should be able to work out all ot they need protection;
the configuraiton issues. It'll cost, IBR cost savings
for AF med nets
but we can do it

Due to uniqueness of the
mission, patient load and types
of sensitive information.

Design & implement of
577106. What's the area of greatest Training and establish new
intelligent systems
expense in the config chosen in
mindset
567105.
597108. What net sec config is best 1/2 million people in the .mil pie.
Breaking into smaller pieces will
for AF nets
crease less opportunity for
exploitation. Can provide multiple

Short term: Infrastructure
Long Term: Training
serves the needs for that group.
Commonality of function,
mission, etc.

Im/pl« nf Kon iritv

607109. What's the area of greatest
expense in the config chosen in
597108

Net Sec Equipment and
Infrastructure

Infrastructure

Training

617110. What other areas of
consideration have impact in
choosing net sec config

Business partner vulnerabilities
(middlemen)

Top down direction/Buy
in; Each service on
own/interop

look at the uniqueness of each
base. Training of network staff
(3CO's) not available to med net
personnel

627111. What other net sec
alternatives could be included

77

D

E

34V79. Added Cost areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to 1 BR
36./81. Added Cost areas: Impact of
miaration of BR to I BR
3S./83. How capable is SOTA in Net
Sec for AF med nets

can go up an item depending
on comDlexitv
Capability to overcome vulnerabilities is there.

85. How capable is SOTA in Net Sec
for AF nets
40./87. Attacker interest in
networked data

same as 83
nature of the attacker is to go after the most
critical info.

42./89. Vulnerability of netorked data Mission stuff is likely on
We have too many connections to manage.
classified network; good
emphasis to stay on top of
this
44./91. Attacker ability to gain user
Barrier Reef has reduced their ability
access
46./93. How likely will attackers be
dissuaded from attacking based on
net sec
48795. User Trust Ordering of net
sec options

F
still same link to outside

Most hackers go for publicity
(hacking web sites); maliscious
hackers will go for the most
damaging or sensitive info
all equal since for most part
they are protected

AF much better protected than
civilian

based on a risk of prosecution

An isolated configuration
makes easier to defend so
increases reliability

50./97./99. How does net sec config.
Reflect trust of users
52./101. How trust-worthy are AF
Low; backdoors
med nets

different- they usually go
elsewhere because they go for
targets that have an area easy
to exploit

they can be a lot better. But are better than other Do have protective measure =
expect
those w/BR

54./103 How trust-worthy are the AF
med nets perceived

Most believe hospital networks
are unprotected

56./105. What net sec config is best Isolation has good points; Cuts down on access points
for AF med nets
some exception (outgoing
modems only) for quick
movement of life critical
infn
57./106. What's the area of greatest Training of personnel
TRAINING!
expense in the config chosen in
56./105.
59./108. What net sec config is best Same & better to work
for AF nets
w/single front door

BR costs would be covered by
base; no real increase in costs

60./109. What's the area of greatest
expense in the config chosen in
59./108

Training

Training again but to a lesser degree

61./110. What other areas of
consideration have impact in
choosing net sec config

Greater bandwidth to
accomadate
speed/throughput

AF addresses everything in terms of costs as
downward directed programs
opposed to best value. Also standardization of
from many sources; AF base
solution (BR) can lead to a common vulnerability. level is also an issue
Using multiple, equally effective configurations
would minimize this.

62./111. What other net sec
alternatives could be included

BR is the way to go.
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Training is biggest; no short
cuts available in AF; we train
them and they leave for

G
34/79. Added Cost areas: Impact of More work, more costs
migration of No BR to 1 BR

H
dedicated contract support and move
lines

36./81. Added Cost areas: Impact of
miaration of BR to I BR
38783. How capable is SOTA in Net It's there; it'll work if politics and the
Sec for AF med nets
"people" use it to its potential.

same as 79
capability is there (equip) to lock
things; minimal addressing of human
factors social engineering such as
woak naRRwnrris shamd annpss ptr
same as 83

85. How capable is SOTA in Net Sec same as 83
for AF nets
40787. Attacker interest in
networked data

I
More connections requires more
contractor support and more oversight

Technology definitely exists; but would
severely limit current support
capability for sharing critical info.
same as 83

mission is always an area of high
interest

42789. Vulnerability of netorked data SOTA in net sec is not implemented

social engineering and political factors
keep us from walling up all the holes;
impact customer service too

44791. Attacker ability to gain user
access

most have sufficient protection

same as 89

46793. How likely will attackers be
dissuaded from attacking based on
net sec
48795. User Trust Ordering of net
sec options

attackers will go where its easiest to
get in

would get better results if could fully
implement to the capability threshold
there is some lack of trust in all but
ranked as indicated

monitoring and audits of network
activity (provided by BR) keep this
rinwn

They have more trust for the
configuraiton that is more in their
control (closer to them) and that keeps
others out

increases in security measures
50797799. How does net sec config.
Reflect trust of users
indicate decreases in trust of users
There are still backdoors.
527101. How trust-worthy are AF
Have multiple access points. Focuses not sure but their focus is customer
med nets
on the day-to-day med needs and not service and access to info for many
on security
groups; so decreased focus in security
Yes there are backdoors, but others
don't fully understand how the system
is set up and what the vulnerabilities

547103 How trust-worthy are the AF
med nets perceived

same

567105. What net sec config is best Isolation of the medical networks will
for AF med nets
cost through the nose, but it will give
both the base and the medical
neetworks the chance for security

none really answer all problems so BR Enables Med to conduct business at
the level to provide needed service to
would be a default
physicians etc. (tel-net from home).
Also healthcare is a regional activity,

577106. What's the area of greatest Getting the technology and the
expense in the config chosen in
equipment in place
567105.
597108. What net sec config is best
for AF nets

political factors; dealing with decreased Net Sec equip is important in the short
customer service
term then Training becomes the focus
Mission critical info is minimal on SBU
nets and secret should be first focus

Each base has diferrent mission
requirements

607109. What's the area of greatest
expense in the config chosen in
597108

Maint. & training

Net Sec equip is important in the short
term then Training becomes the focus

nrxf haeo cne»rfir>

Initial Equipment, then Training of
personnel

617110. What other areas of
consideration have impact in
choosing net sec config

the need for continuity leads the
Really need a unified IT Plan. There
network jobs to being GS or contractor is a big disconnect between the SG
notGI
and SC communities. Civilian
continuity would reduce training
issues (costs), etc.

627111. What other net sec
alternatives could be included

NIo solution will fix all problems
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J

K

L
Again Providing more POPs is costly

34/79. Added Cost areas: Impact of
migration of No BR to 1 BR
36./81. Added Cost areas: Impact of
miaration of BR to 1 BR
38-/83. How capable is SOTA in Net The authority is the limiting
Sec for AF med nets
factor; the leadership
wants access
85. How capable is SOTA in Net Sec same as 83
for AF nets
40./87. Attacker interest in
networked data

People are the limiting factor;
they trust too much when
they shouldn't
same
The attackers are interested in anything they
can get a hold of

42./S9. Vulnerability of netorked data we are protecting those
assets but there are
always new hacker tools

back doors lead to problems

44./91. Attacker ability to gain user
access
46-/93. How likely will attackers be
dissuaded from attacking based on
net SRC

Given thai not all have moved from No BR,
IPAP instpections have revealed many
they do it because they
want to and we can't
retaliate

M
same

BR and IBR may have some effect. Limits
the direct access to the systems and

backdoors exist

Isolated BR gives more front
doors to potential attackers

48-/95. User Trust Ordering of net
sec options

closer control of BR will give
more sense of control and
security

50./97./99. How does net sec config.
Reflect trust of users
Must deal with their
52./101. How trust-worthy are AF
med nets
outside connections

In some cases they are being blocked out;
some vulnerabitties still exist.

54./103 How trust-worthy are the AF
med nets perceived

Red-headed stepchild-its easiest to point to
us, even when not warranted

56./105. What net sec config is best under organizational
for AF med nets
control won't have
incompatibilities of lower
units

Must maintain affiliation with outside
Nature of the medical info systems
agencies and other medical facilities despite (dependent on outside sources of info-private
the security issue
hospitals, doctors, DoD and AF too) requires
a different approach. Focus isn't on security

57./106. What's the area of greatest Start up costs: Training §
expense in the config chosen in
Equipment
5B./105.
59./10S. What net sec config is best
for AF nets

Number and training of personnel to
handlethe toad

60./109. What's the area of greatest
expense in the config chosen in
59./108

same as 106

Number and training of personnel to
handlethe load

61./110. What other areas of
consideration have impact in
choosing net sec config

Sell ideas to descision
makers and users - need
top down support; BR
process: SC community in
full control of Hospital

Cutting across services causes problems in Biggest problem is that the systems aren't
Building Firewalls behind the
moving past parochial interests (each has
deployed by the Air Force. Most are directed front door firewall
different focus thai the medical service must From beyond the AF's control and have
contend with. Need One POC for managing different requirements. HA and SG not
it all to deal with this.
working with SC.

62./111. What other net sec
alternatives could be included

back door

Outages of network service and backdoors
give the impression we don't know what we're
doing.

Get and Pay for Personnel

Time, the other stuff is in
place (sunk costs)

M.ed is only one having real probs with BR. It On the SBU side we can
seems to work for everyone else.
control things better if
allowed to

Use something Like Cisco's Fix Firewall to
increase throuohout for the customers

80

Training Personnel

no change
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